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51. Introduction
In July 2011, 33 national articles on the theme of ‘adapting 
unemployment benefit systems to the economic cycle’ were 
commissioned from the European Employment Observatory 
(EEO) network of SYSDEM experts. This document summarises 
key messages emerging from these articles and draws 
links with policy developments, studies and data collected 
at European and international level. Further detail on the 
national-level developments discussed in this report can be 
found in the national articles, which are available on the EEO 
website (http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/).
This executive summary is split into four sections, in line with 
the structure of the national articles. The remainder of this 
introductory section provides a discussion of unemployment 
and expenditure on labour market policies in Europe using 
data collected at European level. Section 2 discusses the 
different unemployment benefit (UB) systems and labour 
market incentives in place across the 33 countries covered by 
the Review, including for example how the issue of benefit 
traps and benefit dependence are addressed. Section 3 reviews 
the different reforms to UB systems implemented across 
Europe during the economic crisis and looks at the reasons for 
implementing these reforms as well as any initial indications of 
whether they have been successful. In Section 4, the national 
responses to the reform priorities identified in the Europe 2020 
Framework are discussed. Finally, a concluding section sums up 
the key messages emerging from the national articles.
1.1. European context  
The global financial and economic crisis which started in 
the autumn of 2008 had a dramatic impact across European 
labour markets, although in some countries the labour 
markets initially showed good resilience. Between 2008 
and 2010, the average unemployment rate in the EU-27 rose 
from 7. .7 %, an increase of percentage points. 
However, the performance of the Member States varied 
widely: by 2010, unemployment rates in the EU varied 
between 4.4 % in Austria to 20.1 % in Spain, as illustrated 
by Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 - Unemployment rates in 2010 (annual average, %)
0
5
10
15
20
25
ESLVLTEESKIEELPTHUBGFREU-27PLSEIT FIBEUKDKSIROCZDEMTCYNLLUAT
Source: Eurostat, LFS
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6The labour markets of Ireland, Spain, Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania were the most affected by the crisis, with increases 
of unemployment rates between 7.4 and 12 percentage 
points between 2008 and 2010, as shown in Figure 2, below.
Figure 2 – Difference in unemployment rate between 2008 and 2010 (percentage points)
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Source: Eurostat, LFS
As a response to the high levels of unemployment 
brought about by the recession, European countries 
have swiftly increased expenditure on labour market 
policies (LMPs). These include on the one hand Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) to help jobseekers return 
to employment and passive labour market measures 
which aim to guarantee a security of income for those 
outside the labour market. Among passive labour 
market measures, out-of-work income maintenance 
and support (1) is defined as financial assistance that 
aims to compensate individuals for loss of wage or 
salary and support them during their job search. It is 
mostly composed of unemployment benefits but can 
also include other measures such as short-time working 
allowances, special or one-off allowances.
(1) Here we refer to Eurostat category 8 of labour market expenditure ‘out-of-
work income maintenance and support’ in order to provide comparable 
data for all EU Member States.
Overall, expenditure on out-of-work maintenance and 
support in the EU-27 went up from 0.87 % to 1.32 % of GDP 
between 2007 and 2009. However this increase did not entail 
any reduction in budget for other employment policies such 
as ALMPs: indeed, total labour market expenditure in the 
EU-27 also increased from 1.60 % of GDP in 2007 to 2.17 % of 
GDP in 2009. 
When compared to the evolution of the unemployment rate 
in the EU-27, the increase in labour market expenditure - and 
in particular expenditure linked to out-of-work maintenance 
and support - was steeper, as illustrated by Figure 3. This 
suggests that a majority of Member States have mobilised 
out-of-work income maintenance and support measures to 
cushion the social impact of the recession.
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7Figure 3 – Evolution of unemployment and labour market policies between 2006 and 2009 in the EU-27 (in %, compared to 
2006 level)
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However, there is wide variation between EU countries in terms 
of expenditure on out-of-work maintenance and support as 
a share of GDP, average cost of measures per participant and 
trends. For instance, expenditure on out-of-work maintenance 
and support as a share of GDP ranged from 0.21 % in Poland to 
2.92 % in Spain in 2009, the EU-27 average being 1.32 %. Both 
Spain and Ireland spent more than 2 % of their GDP on this 
type of measure in 2009, as shown by Figure 4 below. 
Figure 4 - Expenditure on out-of-work maintenance and support as a percentage of GDP in 2009
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Source: Eurostat
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8All EU countries recorded an increase in expenditure on out-of-work 
maintenance and support as a percentage of GDP throughout 2007-
2009, with an average 0.45 percentage point increase. In Lithuania, 
Italy, Latvia, Estonia, Spain and Ireland higher increases were 
recorded than the EU-27 average, particularly marked in the 
case of the latter three countries, as shown in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5 – Difference between expenditure on out-of-work maintenance and support as a percentage of GDP in 2007 and 
2009 (in percentage points)
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Differences between the levels of expenditure across 
countries are linked with variations in the average cost of 
out-of-work income maintenance and support measures. For 
instance, unemployment benefits are calculated in different 
ways across all countries. The length of benefit, level of 
benefit and eligibility criteria differ across national systems, 
as will be discussed in more detail below. 
In the EU, the average costs of out-of-work income 
maintenance and support measures are close to EUR 9 000 
per year per participant, the lowest average cost of measures 
being in Bulgaria and the highest in Denmark, as shown in 
Figure 6. The average costs per year per participant across 
the EU-27 have remained broadly unchanged since 2007, 
however average costs rose by more than EUR 1 000 in 
Slovakia, Spain, Latvia, Finland, Denmark and Estonia, while 
a significant decrease of over EUR 2 600 was recorded in 
Slovenia (2).
(2) In addition a very significant decrease of over EUR 9 000 is recorded in 
Luxembourg. However as this figure is so high it is possible that the data 
is not reliable. 
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9Figure 6 – Average cost of out-of-work income maintenance and support measures in EUR per year and participant in 2009 
Source: Eurostat
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It is worth noting that the average cost of these measures 
per participant per year is not necessarily linked to the 
level of unemployment. For instance, as shown in Figure 7 
below, Austria and Spain, two countries with dramatically 
different unemployment rates, have similar average costs 
per participant. 
Figure 7 – Unemployment rates and average cost of out-of-work income maintenance and support measures in EUR per year 
and participant in 2009
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European countries thus differ considerably in terms of 
the payment levels, composition and design of their UB 
systems. Some countries have traditionally relied more than 
others on higher unemployment benefits. These differences 
are predominantly linked to the differences in size and 
organisation of the welfare state and a different overall 
institutional set-up in relation to providing income support 
to unemployed people. The following section will provide an 
overview of the approaches taken by the 33 countries covered 
by this Review to the provision of unemployment benefits.
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2. UB systems and labour market 
incentives in the EEO countries
2.1. The design and ﬁnancing of UB systems
Across the 33 EEO countries, it appears that the majority of 
UB systems are funded via contributions from employees 
and/or employers. Only in the Netherlands is the UB system 
financed by employers alone. There, in 2009 it was agreed that 
contributions would no longer be required from employees 
following a tripartite agreement between the government 
and the social partners. In return, the social partners agreed 
to a wage development for the year 2009, intended not to 
exceed the wage growth of 2008.
State funding and contributions (sourced for example from 
tax revenues) to UB systems appear to be less common, 
although some form of state contribution is made to either 
UB systems or other income support in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Sweden and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). In Sweden for example, the public unemployment 
insurance system is administered by the trade unions’ 
unemployment insurance funds but is regulated and 
subsidised by the State. While the contribution from the 
trade unions’ funds covers approximately 30 % of the costs, 
the State subsidises the remaining 70 %. In Denmark too, 
state contributions play an important role in enabling the 
country’s 27 unemployment insurance funds to meet extra 
demand in times of high unemployment and are an important 
contributing factor to the automatic fiscal stabilisation of the 
Danish macro-economy. The members of the unemployment 
insurance funds are only obliged to pay a fixed membership 
contribution, independent of the actual overall level of 
unemployment or the specific risk of unemployment for 
the individual unemployment insurance fund. It is the share 
of public funding that depends on the total number of 
unemployed; in periods of high unemployment as in the early 
1990s, the Government’s share increases up to 80 %, while it 
falls to less than 50 % during economic upswings. Similarly, 
in Hungary, the UB system is insurance-based and financed 
from contributions, plus funds from the central budget if 
benefit payments exceed contributions. In Poland, the main 
source of financing of unemployment benefits is the Labour 
Fund, to which employers pay contributions amounting to 
2.45 % of gross salaries and additional financing is provided 
by EU-funded projects and budgetary donations. 
In a number of countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden), there are parallel compulsory and voluntary 
unemployment insurance schemes. For example, in 
Bulgaria, the social insurance system for unemployment 
includes a compulsory state scheme and voluntary private 
schemes. In Finland, the most common way for people to 
obtain UB is to be a member of one of the 30 unemployment 
insurance funds, which requires a payment of an annual 
membership fee of between 1 % and 2 % of the employee’s 
gross pay. For those who do not belong to a fund, there is 
a basic unemployment allowance granted by the Social 
Security Institution (KELA).
In addition, in most countries there are complementary 
systems of UB and/or social assistance. Firstly, there are a 
number of countries where UB itself is made up of two parts - 
a contributions-related part (financed through contributions 
by employers and employees) and a welfare assistance part 
(generally financed through taxation and the state budget). 
This is the case for example in Cyprus, Spain, Estonia, Ireland, 
Malta and Portugal. In Ireland, the UB system has two 
main components, involving two different types of benefit 
payment. Firstly, there is a support system financed from the 
National Social Insurance Fund, called ‘Jobseekers Benefit’ 
(JB), for unemployed persons who have made weekly 
employment-based contributions to this Fund (Pay Related 
Social Insurance, PRSI contributions). Alternatively, persons 
who do not have such insurance, or whose PRSI entitlement 
is insufficient, or has run out, can apply for a ‘Jobseekers 
Allowance’ (JA). The cost of the latter benefit is funded 
from the national exchequer. In Spain, the UB system is 
composed of a contributory strand and an assistance strand: 
the contributory strand applies to workers who have paid 
contributions for a sufficient period and have finished their 
employment contract, who are entitled to ‘unemployment 
benefit’ (prestación por desempleo). The welfare assistance 
strand applies to people who have exhausted their 
unemployment benefit and is called the ‘unemployment 
subsidy’ (subsidio de desempleo). 
Secondly, in addition to unemployment benefits, social 
assistance benefits provide a ‘safety net’ for people who are 
not eligible for UB or whose UB has expired, to ensure they 
have some income and are protected from falling (further) 
into poverty. These systems become ever more important 
in the context of an economic downturn, when more and 
more families face reduced incomes. They seem to be 
generally funded by the state and tend to be means tested. 
Furthermore the duration of social welfare benefit payments 
tends to be unlimited. For example in Spain, in addition 
to the UB and unemployment subsidy, there is the active 
insertion income (renta de inserción activa), which is a social 
benefit linked to training and active job search. In Estonia, 
in addition to unemployment benefits, the unemployed are 
entitled to means-tested subsistence benefits, which are 
administered by the municipalities. 
In Italy, as described in Box 1 below, there are three types 
of benefit, depending on the circumstances of the individual 
concerned. 
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Box 1: Unemployment benefits in Italy
In Italy, the UB system is characterised by three types of 
benefit: 
1)  partial unemployment benefits granted in the case of a 
temporary reduction of working hours or suspension 
of economic activity (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG 
schemes); 
2)  full unemployment benefits granted to laid-off workers, 
in the case of individual and collective dismissals (unem-
ployment and ‘mobility’ allowances, respectively); and 
3)  special regimes covering sectors characterised by high lev-
els of seasonal employment (agriculture and construction). 
The system is funded on an insurance basis, i.e. through the 
payment of social contributions by employees and employers. 
There are also exceptional unemployment benefit schemes 
(ammortizzatori sociali in deroga) which are financed through 
general taxation. Recourse to these schemes has dramatically 
increased during the crisis. The Italian system does not include 
a universal means-tested benefit, except for the over 65s. More-
over, self-employed and ‘project’ workers are not covered by or-
dinary schemes, which are available only to employees.
Responsibility for the administration and management of the 
UB systems generally resides with the Public Employment 
Services (PES), either national and/or regional. This is the case 
for example in Estonia, Greece, Austria, Romania, Croatia, 
Iceland and Norway. In Latvia and Slovakia, there are ‘social 
insurance agencies’ which administer the unemployment 
insurance. In Malta, unemployment benefits are awarded 
by the Social Security Department (SSD), while in order to 
claim such benefits, a person must register for employment 
with the Employment and Training Corporation (ETC), the 
country’s PES. Thus, the management of the UB system in 
Malta falls under both the PES and the SSD.
In some countries, the social partners are also involved in the 
UB system (e.g. Belgium, France, Sweden and Iceland). This 
is particularly notable in France, where the unemployment 
insurance benefit system is managed by social partners via 
Unédic, a kind of foundation composed of the main French 
social partners. The allocation of responsibilities within the 
system is also unusual: with the agreement of the Ministry of 
Employment, the French social partners can decide on rules 
of compensation and financing while in most other Member 
States these are generally fixed by the state, with the social 
partners playing a consultative role.
2.2. Entitlement and eligibility criteria – who is 
eligible to receive unemployment beneﬁt?
UB claimants are subject to both ‘entitlement’ and ‘eligibility’ 
conditions. The OECD defines ‘entitlement conditions’ as 
those which restrict benefits to people who either have 
a sufficient record of contributions or a low total income 
(depending on the type of benefit), whereas ‘eligibility 
conditions’ are those which relate to being able to enter work 
at short notice, as well as undertaking active steps to look for 
work and meeting certain administrative requirements (3). 
Some of the most commonly cited entitlement and eligibility 
criteria are listed below.
t A minimum contribution / employment history in recent 
years. In most countries it is necessary to have contributed 
to the unemployment insurance fund in order to receive 
benefits. The duration of the contribution history required 
varies between countries. For example in Slovakia, 
claimants must have contributed to the unemployment 
insurance fund for at least two years over the last three 
years (or the last four years for those previously employed 
in fixed-term jobs). In Turkey, the reference period is the 
past three years before job loss and the required minimum 
employment record is 600 days. Of these, at least 120 days 
must have been accumulated in the past year. In France, 
only four months of work history in the last 28 is required.
In Austria, the duration of the qualifying period depends on 
the age of the unemployed person and whether it is a first-
time claim or a repeat claim (26 weeks within the last year 
for young persons under 25, 52 weeks within the last two 
years for first-time claims and 28 weeks within the last year 
for people not claiming for the first time). In Finland, Poland 
and Norway, claimants must also have earned a certain level 
of income (e.g. an income equal to at least the minimum 
wage in Poland) during this period in order to qualify for UB. 
In Sweden, the claimant must also have worked a minimum 
number of hours (80 per month over 12 months, or at least 
480 hours over six consecutive calendar months and at least 
50 hours in each of these months) during the qualifying 
period. 
t The claimant must be available for or capable of and actively 
seeking work: As described below, active job search is 
often monitored by the PES, for example through the use 
of individual job search / action plans.
t The recipient must accept any ‘reasonable’ job offer: The 
definition of a ‘reasonable’ or ‘suitable’ job can vary from 
country to country and might relate to previous earnings 
or the skills and level of education required to carry out 
the role. For example in the Netherlands a suitable job is 
(3) OECD, 2000, ‘Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits’, in 
Employment Outlook 2000. Internet: http://www.oecd.org/data-
oecd/10/46/2079577.pdf
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defined as a job with 70 % of the income of the individual’s 
previous job. In Slovenia and FYROM, the definition 
relates to the skills required to carry out the job. The 
definition of ‘reasonable’ relates to the location of the job 
in Finland – job offers may be located anywhere within 
the ‘commuting area’, which consists of a person’s home 
town and those towns to which it is possible to commute 
in one day. 
The definition of what is a ‘reasonable job offer’ may also vary 
in relation to the duration of unemployment. For example, in 
Denmark an unemployed person who has been unemployed 
for more than three months must accept any job offered by 
the PES that the person could perform. In the Netherlands 
again, once the duration of UB has ended and the claimant 
moves on to social security benefits, he or she must accept 
any job available, regardless of how much it pays.
t The reason the person left his or her previous job may be taken 
into account (i.e. they must have left their job involuntarily): 
Persons who leave their job voluntarily, or as a result of 
employee misconduct, may not be eligible for any UB, or 
may have to wait a certain period before they can claim. 
In Croatia for example, the termination of employment 
should not have been voluntary or due to misconduct, 
unless it is caused by unacceptable behaviour of the 
employer. In Lithuania, unemployed persons who were at 
fault for their dismissal are not granted benefits until three 
months after the date of registration at the local labour 
exchange, LLE (normally the benefit is granted eight days 
after registration). Estonia is an exception here, where 
from 2013 onwards it is foreseen that workers who leave 
their job voluntarily should be eligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits (providing they meet certain other 
eligibility criteria)(4). 
t The ‘proportion’ of (un)employment: In some countries it 
is not necessary to be unemployed ‘full-time’ in order to 
claim benefits and it is possible to work either part-time, 
or on short-term contracts but still to claim benefits. This 
makes it possible either to maintain or to build a new 
link with the labour market. In the UK for example, those 
eligible for Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) must currently 
work less than 16 hours per week. In Cyprus, when an 
unemployed individual holds a job earning above a 
prescribed cut-off and for which the employer makes 
social security contributions, s/he is not considered 
unemployed for those days; thus, their maximum of 
156 days of benefit is not used up and re-entry into the 
labour market is facilitated. In Hungary, work is permitted 
to some extent for UB claimants – for short-term work (up 
to 90 days) during which benefit is suspended. In Greece, 
as in Italy, there is a specific seasonal UB which is offered 
(4) This change has been agreed by social partners. However, due to the 
high increase in expenses that this would entail, it is not sure whether 
the agreement will be fully implemented.
to persons belonging to occupational groups employed 
on a seasonal basis (e.g. construction workers). 
t The person must not be claiming a pension or other (e.g. 
sickness) benefit: In the Czech Republic, retired people 
who have already claimed a state pension are not eligible 
for UB even if they have contributed to the system for 
over 12 months during the base period. UBs are also not 
provided during periods of receipt of sickness benefits and 
when collecting benefits related to retraining. Moreover, 
the UB level is also set extremely low for those returning 
to the labour market from parental leave who do not 
satisfy the contribution condition in the base period. In 
the Netherlands, employees are excluded from UB if they 
are entitled to sickness benefit, full disability benefit or 
maternity leave benefit. 
t Age: Age limits imply that the young unemployed and 
older workers who are approaching retirement may not 
be eligible for benefits. For instance, in Ireland, JA is not 
available to persons who are aged under 18 and/or have 
been out of school for less than three months. In the 
Netherlands, employees are excluded from UB if they are 
65 years or older. In the UK, JSA recipients must be over 
18 and below the state pension age. 
t Family situation: The number of dependents is taken into 
account when calculating benefit entitlements in certain 
countries (e.g. Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Finland). In Austria, while the average monthly 
UB is generally 55 % of previous net earnings, family 
supplements are granted for children and partners who 
have no income above the marginal earnings threshold.
There are also certain procedures a person must go through 
in order to receive benefits and /or to enable the PES to 
monitor eligibility and compliance with conditions. Often 
the unemployed must first register with the PES before they 
can receive UB. The period within which they have to do this 
varies across the countries covered by the Review. In Finland 
for example the jobseeker must register on the first day of 
unemployment whereas in Croatia the timeframe is within 
30 days of the termination of employment. 
Following registration, regular attendance at the job centre is 
a requirement in certain countries. In the UK for instance, JSA 
claimants are normally required to attend the job centre on 
a fortnightly basis, although this interval may be extended 
where the claim goes beyond 13 weeks. In Spain, the intervals 
are less regular and unemployed people benefiting from both 
contributory unemployment benefit and from unemployment 
assistance have to sign up every three months in the PES in order 
to continue receiving their benefits. In Belgium, it is not until 
the 21st month of unemployment (15th month for those aged 
under 25) that the PES sets up an interview with the individual. 
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Job search plans, or individual action plans, are used both to 
support and monitor the unemployed in their job search in 
a number of countries, including the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Hungary, Portugal and Croatia. In Portugal for example, the 
Personal Employment Plan (PEP) is considered to play an 
important role in the process of job search conditionality, 
monitoring and control. Here, since 2006, individuals’ 
registration in the job centre is cancelled and therefore they 
lose the right to any kind of benefits or allowances if, without 
relevant justification, they refuse: job centre attendance 
(every two weeks), vocational training, occupational 
programmes, PEP actions, active job search and suitable job 
offers. In Croatia, active job search is monitored through job 
search plans which are revised every six months. Job search 
conditionality is the same for all of the unemployed and 
requires monthly registration, participation in activation-
related events organised by the PES and the job search plan, 
and an obligation to respond to all calls from the PES. 
In certain countries, sanctions are applied to those recipients 
of UB who do not comply with the relevant eligibility 
conditions. For example, in Estonia, the unemployment 
allowance is suspended for 10 days if the person does not 
complete their job search plan, refuses an offer of suitable 
work or does not attend the PES on a fixed date for the 
first time. The benefit is stopped altogether if the same 
conditions are violated for a second time. In Ireland, in 
early 2010 the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
was introduced, which provides for sanctions to be applied 
to registered unemployed persons unreasonably refusing 
take up employment offers or to participate in training 
and education. This means that the conditionality now 
embraces not only requirements regarding availability and 
job search but also the beneficiary’s response to specific 
offers of work or training. A person cannot put forward 
unreasonable restrictions such as the nature or location 
of employment, hours of work, pay rates, etc. In FYROM, 
people who are registered unemployed and do not fulfil 
the active job search criteria (regular re-registration in the 
Employment Service Agency, ESA, attending interviews with 
employers arranged by the ESA, accepting a suitable job 
offer in terms of educational attainment and knowledge, 
accepting participation in ALMPs, etc.) are deleted from the 
unemployment register for one year and lose the right to 
receipt of UB.
In certain countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta, 
Slovenia), the conditions associated with receipt of UB 
have been tightened over recent years (in some cases, as a 
response to the economic crisis – see Section 3 for further 
details). In Slovenia for instance, in 2006 tighter conditions 
were introduced regarding the obligation to accept 
work. The amended Employment and Insurance against 
Unemployment Act (2006) stipulated that the right to UB 
may be claimed by an insured person who was employed 
with one or more employers for at least 12 months during the 
last 18 months prior to the termination of the employment 
contract. This condition made access to UB harder for mainly 
younger unemployed persons who were on fixed-term 
contracts with several and/or lengthy job interruptions. 
The 2006 amendments also introduced a new definition 
of a ‘suitable job’ or ‘suitable employment’ which forced 
unemployed persons to become more flexible in accepting 
job offers. Thus, people who were unemployed for up to 
three months were obliged to accept suitable employment 
with required skills at one educational level lower than 
attained and people who were unemployed for six months 
should accept suitable employment with required skills at 
two levels lower. The amended act also defined sanctions for 
not accepting such employment – up to expelling the person 
from the unemployment register. In Malta too, over the 
past five years, the Employment and Training Corporation 
(ETC) has increased the obligations placed on registered 
unemployed persons who wish to continue receiving UB. 
Newly registered unemployed persons must take part in job 
search skills courses and job clubs to facilitate their insertion 
in employment. The registered unemployed are also obliged 
to attend all compulsory employment and training activities 
assigned to them. If they fail to do so, they are required to fill 
out a justification form giving the reasons for their absence. If 
it is decided that such reasons are not justified, they are struck 
off the unemployment register, losing UB for six months.
As a result of these eligibility criteria, certain groups may 
find themselves excluded from unemployment benefits. 
In particular, according to the national articles for this EEO 
Review young people and the self-employed are often 
excluded. Thus in Italy for example, the self-employed and 
‘project’ workers are not covered by ordinary UB schemes, 
which are addressed to employees only. Young people are 
excluded in Croatia, where groups without work experience, 
including first-time labour market entrants and students 
are not eligible for UB. In Slovakia, it is not just first-time 
labour market entrants but also those young people who 
were on fixed-term contracts with several and/or lengthy job 
interruptions who find it hard to access UB. 
Sometimes, young people may be subject to different 
conditions, or entitled to a different amount or duration 
of benefit, rather than fully excluded from the system. 
For example, in Finland, an additional precondition for 
young people (17–25 years old) wishing to receive the 
earnings-related unemployment allowance is to have a 
vocational qualification. If the young person does not have 
a vocational qualification he/she must have at least five 
months working history or five months of participation in 
active measures. In addition, 18–25 year olds who do not 
have a relevant qualification may receive a labour market 
subsidy provided that they are applying to at least three 
different educational institutions per year. Persons aged 
17–18 are entitled to a subsidy provided that they are taking 
part in active measures.
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2.3. The level and duration of unemployment 
beneﬁts and the question of ‘beneﬁt traps’
As explained above, the level and duration of unemployment 
benefits and the way they are calculated vary considerably 
across Europe. Replacement rates depend for instance 
on the previous level of earnings, the length of previous 
employment and also the family income. Available data from 
the OECD show for instance that net replacement rates (5) 
(taking into account unemployment benefits but also other 
types of benefit) during the initial phase of unemployment 
can vary from 33 % for a single individual without children in 
Ireland to 92 % for a two-earner couple with two children in 
Luxembourg (6).
Most countries seem to calculate the level of benefit to be 
paid in relation to the previous income of the claimant. In 
Germany for example, Unemployment Benefit I (UB-I) is a 
regular unemployment benefit for single people providing 60 % 
of the last net income for 12 months (for parents the benefit 
rate is 67 %). In Latvia, beneficiaries initially receive 55 %, 60 % 
or 65 % of their average registered gross wage over the 
12 months prior to unemployment, depending on the duration 
of contributions (1-9 years, 10-19 years and 20-29 years). Several 
countries (e.g. Lithuania, Romania and Sweden) calculate the 
benefits to be paid on the basis of a combination of a fixed 
amount, together with an amount calculated in relation to 
the individual’s previous wage. For instance in Sweden, in 
addition to the general basic insurance of SEK 330 (EUR 36) per 
day, income-related benefits for eligible beneficiaries amount 
to 80 % of the previous income during the first 200 days of 
unemployment and 70 % thereafter. 
The duration of UB payments also varies across Europe. It 
is particularly long in Portugal, at a maximum of 900 days 
(for individuals aged over 45 with longer careers), whereas 
in the UK benefits are paid for up to six months. In some 
countries (e.g. France, Slovenia, Turkey and Croatia) the 
duration of benefit payment depends on the contribution or 
employment history of the individual or his / her previous 
income. For instance in Turkey, the maximum duration 
of benefits is from 180 to 300 days, depending on the 
employment record. In Norway, the length of the allowance 
(104 weeks or 52 weeks) depends on whether the jobseeker’s 
income in the calendar year before submitting the claim was 
above or under NOK 151 282 (EUR 19 403). 
Interestingly, in Poland, the period of UB collection depends 
on the rate of unemployment in the local labour market and 
is six months for the unemployed living in areas where the 
unemployment rate does not exceed 150 % of the average 
unemployment rate and twelve months for the unemployed 
(5) Earning level: average wage
(6) Data is for net replacement rates during the initial period of 
unemployment, for individuals earning 100% of the average 
salary in 2009. Source: http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,374
6,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html
in areas where the unemployment rate exceeds 150 % of the 
average unemployment rate in the country.
In many countries, the amount paid in UB is gradually decreased 
over time. For example in Italy, unemployment benefits are 
paid for eight months (twelve for claimants over 50 years old). 
For the first six months the replacement rate is 60 %. It then falls 
to 50 % until the eighth month and finally to 40 %.
Although the amount of benefit to be paid is often 
calculated in relation to the claimant’s previous income, 
many countries impose a ceiling on the amount that can 
be paid out. In France this ceiling is particularly high in 
comparison with other European countries, at EUR 5 800 per 
month. Sometimes the ceiling is fixed in comparison to the 
national average or national minimum wage, as in Slovakia 
for instance, where the maximum level of UB payments 
cannot exceed three times the national average gross wage. 
In Turkey, unemployment benefits are equal to 50 % of the 
last four months’ average gross earnings of the individual but 
these benefits cannot be higher than the official minimum 
wage. In Malta the ceiling is set according to the number of 
contributions paid by the individual. 
In some countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Serbia), both 
minimum and maximum amounts are set. For instance the 
UB replacement rate in Serbia is 50 % of the average wage of 
the unemployed person but it cannot be higher than 160 % 
or lower than 80 % of the minimum wage.
The timeframe over which UB is paid and the amount of 
benefit paid can also depend on the age of the recipient – 
both younger and older workers may be subject to different 
rules. In Ireland, young people aged under 18 receiving JB 
are paid only for a maximum of six months. Furthermore, 
from January 2011 there has been an age differentiation in 
rates for persons in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance (JA). 
For an applicant aged from 18 to 21 years the basic personal 
rate was reduced to EUR 100 and to EUR 144 for those aged 
22 to 24 years. (There are, however, a number of circumstances 
where an age differentiation in rates for persons in receipt of 
Jobseekers Allowance (JA). at the full rate is payable to young 
people, including participation in training or education courses 
or in certain other ALMPs, applicants with dependent children 
etc.) In Luxembourg and Greece, there are specific provisions 
for older jobseekers. In Luxembourg, those aged 50 and 
over who have worked for 30 years benefit from a 12-month 
extension on the normal maximum of 12 months of benefits, 
while those who have worked for 25 years are eligible for a 
9-month extension. Jobseekers aged 45 with 20 years of work 
experience can apply for a 6-month extension. In Greece, 
the maximum duration over which unemployment benefits 
are paid is one year. However, extensions can be granted to 
individuals aged between 45-64 years who have received the 
benefit for 12 months and have remained unemployed for 
another 12 months.
KEAZ11001ENC002pdf.pdf   14 10/11/11   15:12
15
Another factor taken into account is the family status of the 
individual concerned. For instance in Belgium, the level of 
benefits varies according to family status and whether the 
person is ‘head of the household’. In Cyprus, the basic benefit 
is increased by one third for the first dependent and by one 
sixth for each additional dependent (up to a total of three 
dependents). In Sweden, it is the duration of benefits which 
varies, at 450 days for parents of children under 18 years of 
age, compared to a standard benefit period of 300 days.
In some countries, the national articles observe that the UB 
replacement rates have decreased in recent years or that 
they are particularly low. For instance in Greece, estimates 
of the net replacement rates (NRR) over 60 months of 
unemployment indicate that these drop to very low levels 
(26), one of the lowest NRR recorded for the EU countries 
for which data exist. In Poland, data indicate a gradual 
reduction of UB replacement rates in recent years; while 
in 1995 unemployment benefits amounted to 42 % of the 
average wage, currently the ratio of unemployment benefits 
fluctuates at around 22 %. In Sweden, the ceiling for income-
related benefits of SEK 680 (EUR 75) per day has been constant 
since 2002, which implies a decrease in the level of benefits 
in real terms. In the UK, according to a recent review (7) 
the replacement rate has fallen significantly over the past 
40 years – in 1970, for example, it was 19.2 %, almost double 
the 2010 rate of 10.9 % when comparing the basic level of the 
JSA with average earnings. This drop is attributed mainly to 
the decision in the 1980s to link UB with changes in prices 
rather than wages.
Benefit traps and benefit dependence were identified as 
being an issue in a small number of countries (Estonia, 
Spain, Malta, Poland, Finland and Croatia) although the 
issue was highlighted only in relation to specific groups in 
three countries (the long-term unemployed approaching 
retirement in Croatia, the low-paid in Estonia and precarious 
workers in Spain). In Spain, the way in which the duration of 
contributory benefits is calculated means that some workers 
who experience intermittent unemployment can lose their 
entitlement to UB during subsequent unemployment spells. 
It is suggested that this may encourage some temporary 
workers to exhaust all their unemployment benefits in order 
not to lose them and only then look for a job, thus trapping 
them for longer in the benefit system. In Croatia, some 
groups of the long-term unemployed who have gained 
access to permanent benefit until retirement are rarely 
actively seeking work, since their skills and their age make 
them less attractive to employers. Most women above the 
age of 50 have long stopped looking for work and a recent 
(7) New Statesman (2011) Why unemployment benefit is worth less than ever 
(February). Internet: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-stag-
gers/2011/02/unemployment-benefit-forty 
analysis (8) has shown that the PES will prefer not to mediate 
for these groups given that there are many younger and 
more qualified unemployed people who are much more 
attractive to employers. 
In Malta, the benefit trap is thought to affect almost half of 
the unemployed, as explained in Box 2 below.
Box 2: Benefit traps, Malta
In Malta, ETC employment advisors are reported to estimate 
that around 49 % of the unemployed easily get caught in the 
benefit trap. Those below the poverty line are affected, as 
the benefits of the other unemployed tend not to be gener-
ous and cease after 156 days. The unemployment assistance 
package is comparable to the minimum wage; about 80 % 
of the unemployed are low skilled and can aspire to earn 
only this amount. Indeed, research (9) has shown that per-
sons receiving special unemployment benefits or married 
persons would lose money if they found a part-time job and 
it has also described how the benefit system may discour-
age unemployed individuals from becoming self-employed, 
since while they would have to pay social security contribu-
tions they would not receive any unemployment or special 
unemployment benefits if their business fails. The system 
unintentionally encourages the low-skilled registered un-
employed to continue receiving their benefits and engage 
in the hidden economy. 
The system has changed in recent years and persons who 
have been unemployed for three months or over cannot re-
fuse a type of job for which they have signed up. After a year, 
they cannot refuse other similar occupations, even if they 
are temporary in nature. Despite such changes, the Maltese 
government’s expenditure on long-term unemployment as-
sistance is still much higher than that on short-term unem-
ployment benefits.
Countries where, according to the national articles, benefit 
traps do not appear to be a significant problem include Cyprus, 
Estonia (apart from the low-paid, as mentioned above), Spain 
(apart from workers on temporary contracts - see above), Greece, 
the Netherlands, and FYROM. In Spain, the reason given is that 
the level of benefits is low (below the poverty threshold). The 
Estonian national article suggests that since both taxes and 
social expenditure are relatively low, in general, they generate 
high motivation to actively participate in the labour market. Yet 
at the same time, in some cases the Estonian benefit schemes 
can generate disincentives to job search, especially in the case 
of low-paid jobs or entering employment with a part time job.
(8) Sanja Crnković-Pozaić and Branka Meštrović (2011): Women on the 
labour market, IPA project, component IV. Survey of unemployed women 
on the unemployment register and an analysis of the position of women 
from the Labour force survey 2008.
(9) Zerafa, M. A., ‘Unemployment benefits and incentive to seek employ-
ment in Malta’, Bank of Valletta Review, No. 36, Autumn 2007. Internet: 
http://www.bov.com/filebank/documents/33-56_maryanne%20zerafa.pdf
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Measures taken to address benefit traps include providing a 
lump-sum payment to those who do find a job (e.g. Slovakia 
and Romania), providing incentives to take up low-paid work 
(see below) and providing benefits to people who work part-
time (see below). There are incentives for the unemployed 
in Romania to re-enter employment before the termination 
of their legal UB period and in Slovakia, providing the 
jobseeker starts to work before the lapse of the support 
period (six months or four months) but not sooner than after 
three months, he/she is entitled to a one-off payment of 50 % of 
the remaining sum.
Many countries allow workers to supplement their income 
with benefits when taking up low-paid or part-time work 
(e.g. Ireland, France, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Sweden, Croatia, FYROM, Iceland and Norway), as 
this enables the beneficiaries to forge a link with the labour 
market and may be helpful in shortening unemployment 
durations and preventing in-work poverty. Some examples 
are listed below. 
t In Belgium, in certain circumstances, when an unemployed 
person takes up a part time job, he/she may receive a 
top-up allowance from the national employment office 
to supplement his/her earnings (the income guarantee 
allowance).
t In Ireland, a person can be eligible for a reduced rate of 
benefit if working part-time or in casual employment. The 
eligible circumstances are: if working hours are reduced by 
the employer; if the applicant is job sharing (involuntarily); 
or if he/she can only acquire casual or part-time work. It is 
interesting to note that the number of persons receiving 
benefit who are working on a casual or part-time basis has 
increased significantly during the recession – from 21 600 
in January 2008 to 85 600 in June 2011. The latter figure 
represents almost 19 % of the total.
t In Poland, persons with the right to UB are entitled to an 
additional activation allowance if they undertake part-time 
employment with a wage lower than the minimum wage, 
as a result of a referral by the local labour office. (However, 
the low amount of the additional activation allowance 
does not influence the decision of active job search during 
the unemployment period. As existing studies show, the 
unemployed postpone the decision to actively search for 
a job to the end of their benefit entitlement period.)
t In Portugal, a number of changes were made to the UB 
system in August 2010, including enabling the accumulation 
of UB with part-time work or independent work, when this is 
associated with low income. The scope of the Unemployment 
Partial Benefit (UPB) was therefore extended to include not 
only part-time work as defined by previous legislation but 
also, under certain conditions, independent work, facilitating 
the return or transition of unemployed people to active life.
t According to the law in Serbia, unemployment benefits 
shall be suspended for the duration of a contract on 
temporary and casual work. After the expiration of the 
contract the unemployed person regains the entitlement 
to UB payment for the remaining period for which the 
right to UB is recognised (if he/she registers and files 
an application within 30 days). However, in 2009 an 
innovative incentive was introduced which grants a 
subsidy to benefit recipients who find a new job before 
the expiration of their entitlement, equal to 30 % of their 
remaining net benefits.  
2.4. Strengths and weaknesses  
of national UB systems
Across the countries covered by the Review, a range of 
strengths and weaknesses of the current unemployment 
systems have been identified. Strengths were identified in 
the national articles for Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, including for example the opportunity to work part-
time but continue to receive benefits and financial support 
for a sufficient period in order to find a new job (Netherlands), 
providing incentives to job search (Germany) and including 
conditions to limit misuse (Sweden). Weaknesses, which are 
discussed in more detail below, include for example the 
complexity of the systems and procedures and systems 
not being sufficient to prevent certain groups from being 
vulnerable to poverty. 
The UB systems were not considered to provide adequate 
support to prevent poverty in Estonia, France, Austria, 
Slovenia, Finland, Croatia and Turkey. In France, nearly 
one third of unemployed people are thought to be at risk 
of poverty. The tightening of eligibility criteria and 2006 
reform measures of the Slovenian UB contributed to a 
medium-term increase of the at-risk of poverty rates among 
the unemployed – from 33.4 % in 2006 to 43.6 % in 2009. 
Nevertheless, this social security system, despite all the 
changes in the employment system and labour market, 
and despite the declining share of GDP allocated for social 
security (10), was and still is relatively successful in amortising 
the negative effects and creates a relatively low overall at-risk 
of poverty rate. In Croatia, the UB system is not considered 
to be a sufficient income support facility due to its limited 
level and coverage (unemployment tends to last longer than 
the duration of UB). Furthermore, the level of UB is too low 
to protect from poverty any unemployed individual, who 
has only this source of income. (However, in Croatia, the 
family is still the last income safety net and any financial 
gain, including UB, is often only one from among the several 
income strands.) 
(10) According to Eurostat, the share of Slovenian GDP used for social security 
has constantly been decreasing since 2001. Thus, in 2001 the share was 
24.5 %, in 2003 it decreased to 23.7 %, in 2005 it was 23.0 % and in 2008 
the share was 21.5 %.
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The national articles for the Czech Republic, Greece, France, Italy, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Croatia and Turkey suggest that the 
UB systems in these countries leave certain vulnerable groups 
without support. As discussed previously, it is mainly the young 
and the self-employed who are affected. Thus in Slovakia, 
young people and recent graduates are disadvantaged by 
the existing eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance 
benefits, which require an employment record of two years 
in the last three years. In addition, self-employed persons are 
not obliged to pay unemployment insurance and as a result 
the majority of them remain uncovered. In Romania, strict 
eligibility conditions mean that in certain cases young people 
and workers on short and part-time contracts might not benefit 
from UB in all instances. The Greek UB system has been criticised 
for being inequitable, since large categories of the labour force 
(e.g. the self-employed) and of the unemployed (new entrants 
in the labour market) are left practically without coverage, while 
seasonally employed workers (such as construction workers, 
hotel and restaurant employees and education workers), enjoy 
regular support year after year although in practice they do not 
face unemployment. These seasonal workers who are registered 
as unemployed are exempted from activation measures, being 
classified as unemployed workers not seeking a job.
In Latvia, Romania, Croatia and Serbia, undeclared work (UDW) 
is also identified as a problem among the unemployed and in 
Croatia, it is suggested that controls of the informal economy 
are still too weak to prevent opportunistic behaviours where, 
typically, small benefits are added together to provide relatively 
acceptable income support for the family, especially if some 
informal work is engaged in to top up the benefit-related 
household budget. In Romania, the new version of the 
Labour Code provides for a strengthening of sanctions and 
penalties for the recourse to UDW, with individuals and not 
only companies resorting to UDW now being targeted by the 
recently introduced measures.
Another issue raised in the national articles is the complexity of 
the UB systems in certain countries (e.g. France, the  Netherlands 
and the UK). In France and Belgium, the complexity of the 
system is attributed to the fact that responsibilities are shared 
across different actors. In France the system is mainly composed 
of three kinds of benefit: insurance benefits managed by Social 
Partners; assistance benefits managed by the state; and social 
benefits managed by the Local Authorities. This makes the 
system quite complex, due to the separation of responsibilities. 
In the UK, the proposal for a new ‘Universal Credit’ system is in 
part an attempt to simplify the current system, as described in 
Section 4 of this report. 
In Romania, it is suggested that the UB system is in need 
of reform. A recent survey carried out by the World Bank (11) 
found that the current legal framework for unemployment 
insurance is no longer adequate. The system is poorly 
financed, with the serious risk of running into deficit whenever 
the economic cycle enters into downturn and is thus unable 
to provide an automatic stabiliser. Its active measures are 
too rigidly constructed and fail to attract participants. The 
benefit clearly follows the moves of the cycle and fails both 
to shield beneficiaries from falling into poverty as well as 
to induce them to actively search for a job. The training 
provisions are inadequate and it seems that in spite of the 
generosity with which the ESF-financed instrument has been 
shaped with regard to the Romanian PES, little progress has 
been achieved to date.
In some countries, the PES seem to be overburdened and 
unable to cope with the volume of demand they face, or 
there are many registered claimants who are not actively 
seeking work. For example, in Hungary, the PES is in contact 
with only about 52 % of the non-working population and 
a mere 18 % of the registered unemployed are in contact 
with the office on a regular basis. The apparently poor 
overall performance of policies targeting the non-working 
population cannot, however, be attributed only to the PES, 
but is also a result of the operation of the system of old age 
pensions, disability benefits, social benefits and parental 
allowances. Research suggests that generous transfers were 
put in place to dampen the initial shock of the Hungarian 
political and economic transformation. Having locked a 
large number of people in a welfare trap, the PES has little 
chance to activate them. In FYROM, the unemployment 
registry is ‘inflated’ by a high number of people who are not 
actively looking for a job, since the definition of active search 
includes individuals with different job search intensities: 
some individuals search for jobs only by registering in the 
ESA, while ‘more active’ seekers undertake several activities 
to search for employment. The incentive for the ‘over-
registration’ as unemployed is the provision of free health 
insurance for the registered unemployed. Thus although 
there are a range of eligibility criteria in place for continued 
receipt of unemployment benefit, in practice re-registration 
is usually the main and sole ‘activity’ in the job-search 
requirement, given the low labour demand in the country, 
relatively small scope of ALMPs and the high workload of 
the ESA officers (on average, an ESA officer serves about 
700 unemployed persons).
(11) World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (Romania), Consultations 
(Social Inclusion, Social Assistance & Social Insurance), Stakeholders 
Survey, round Apr.2011.
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3. UB reforms during the crisis 
In response to the economic crisis many European countries 
have taken measures to support labour demand and 
household income security. Existing UB arrangements have 
played an important role in their capacity as an ‘automatic 
stabiliser’, delivering income support to households in need 
while providing macroeconomic stabilisation. Furthermore, 
discretionary policy changes in various countries have been 
implemented to widen the scope of UB systems, including 
increasing the duration and level of benefits and granting 
access to groups previously not covered by the UB systems 
– changes which could be characterised as ‘anti cyclical’; 
i.e. the business cycle went down and the protection level 
of unemployment systems went up. In this section, changes 
to the UB systems which were taken during the economic 
downturn are discussed, including the priorities set and 
approaches taken, followed by reasons given by governments 
for taking such actions and concluding with comments on 
preliminary analysis of their success. It is important to note 
however that while all of the changes described took place 
during the economic crisis, they were not all necessarily a 
direct response to the crisis and a number are in fact structural 
reforms which had been planned in advance. 
3.1. Reforms and adjustments to UB systems 
during the economic crisis
In a small number of countries (e.g. Latvia, Romania, Iceland), 
the generosity of the UB systems, either in terms of the amount 
of benefits paid or the duration of the benefit payments, 
was increased during the economic crisis or is planned to 
increase as a result of the crisis (Estonia). In Slovenia, the 
new Labour Market Regulation Act, LMRA (described below) 
also increased the generosity of the benefit system. 
In Latvia, although previously considered to be relatively 
inflexible, the UB system has been adapted in response 
to the crisis. From 1 July 2009 until 31 December 2011, the 
duration of UB was fixed at nine months for all UB recipients 
(instead of a duration varying from four to nine months 
depending on the social insurance record of the individual). 
In Iceland, the maximum UB period was extended in late 
2010 from three to four years for individuals who had begun 
to draw benefits in the period after 1 May 2008. These 
individuals will therefore be insured until the spring of 
2012. The amount of benefits was also increased in Iceland 
during the crisis, first in January 2009 and then in June 2011, 
and basic and earnings-related benefits now stand at ISK 
161 523 (EUR 973) and ISK 254 636 (EUR 1 534) respectively. 
The latter increase corresponded to increases in the new 
general wage settlements in both the private and public 
sector. In accordance with that settlement, recipients of 
UB receive a one-off payment of ISK 50 000 (EUR 301), and 
would also be paid a Christmas bonus of ISK 63 457 (EUR 382). 
Christmas bonuses were paid out for the first time in 2010.
In Romania, in March 2009 the Government decided to extend 
the period for which unemployment benefits were paid by 
three months, as such extending the entitlement period from 
a minimum of six months to nine months and from a maximum 
of 12 months to 15 months, thus enabling certain categories 
of worker to receive UB for periods longer than one calendar 
year. In this way, the Government has shown that while 
Romania’s UB system has no automatic adjustment clause, it 
is nevertheless flexible enough and can perform its automatic 
stabiliser function in accordance with the country’s needs. The 
most visible effect of this was a surge in unemployment which 
was at only 4 % in mid-2008, then jumped to more than 5 % at 
the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, to reach a maximum 
of more than 8 % (according to national data). Subsequently, 
as the provisions of the 2009 act were terminated at the end 
of the year, the unemployment rate began to drop as scores of 
the previous registered unemployed were simply exiting the 
records of the NAE. While boding well for the Government as 
it led to budgetary savings, this did not necessarily translate 
into a return to work but rather a slide into inactivity, as the 
number of vacancies available was, and is (as of 2011), still at 
an all-time low.
Significant changes to the UB system have been proposed 
in Estonia in response to the crisis but their implementation 
has been postponed until January 2013. The proposed 
changes foresee an increase in benefits as well as a significant 
widening of eligibility. In July 2009, the new Employment 
Contracts Act took effect, together with some changes in 
the unemployment insurance scheme. The intention was 
to move the system closer to the concept of flexicurity by 
making it easier and cheaper to lay off workers (increased 
flexibility) and raising unemployment insurance benefits 
(increased security). However, because of the fiscal crisis 
only the first part has been implemented so far. There have 
been (12) plans to raise the unemployment insurance benefit 
in 2013 from 50 % to 70 % of previous earnings during the 
first 100 days of unemployment, and from 40 % to 50 % 
after that period. In addition, there have been plans to raise 
unemployment allowance benefits to 50 % of the national 
minimum wage per month. 
In the Czech Republic, although the replacement ratio (of 
UB relative to previous net monthly wage) was increased 
in January 2009, at the same time the duration of benefit 
payments was decreased. In the pre-crisis period, the 
replacement ratio was set at 50 % during the first two months 
of UB receipt and at 45 % thereafter. In January 2009, the ratio 
was increased to 65 %, 50 %, and 45 % for the first two months, 
the second two months, and for the remaining period of UB 
collection, respectively. However the entitlement period 
(the maximum length of UB collection) was also cut from 
six to five months in January 2009. (Registered unemployed 
(12) Although these changes are part of a social partner agreement, it is not 
certain that they will be implemented due to the economic situation and 
availability of resources.
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over the age of 50 (55) can collect benefits for an additional 
3 (6) months.) At the same time the eligibility criteria were 
also changed. Until 2009, it was possible to count specific 
non-working spells of up to 6 months, such as participation 
in education, towards the 12-month contribution period 
required. However this option was cancelled with the arrival 
of the crisis. 
The duration of benefit payments was also decreased 
during the crisis in Serbia, from a maximum of 18 months 
to a maximum of 12 months and in Ireland, where in 
October 2008 the maximum durations over which JB was 
paid were reduced from 15 and 12 months (depending on 
the individual’s contributions history), to 12 and 9 months 
(6 months for young people aged under 18). These changes 
were made as part of the wider financial consolidation which 
has been implemented in Ireland.
In France, over the last 20-25 years, with a continual growth 
in unemployment, there have been many changes to the 
system of unemployment insurance, due most of the time 
to economic crises and their financial consequences for 
the system. During the 1980s, the duration of insurance 
was widely extended to address the beginning of the rise 
in unemployment, but since 1990, Unédic representatives 
chose in the context of an increase in structural 
unemployment to reduce both the duration and levels of 
admission to insurance benefits. The benefits cover for 
long-term unemployment has been progressively reduced 
and instead a minimum wage has been introduced, which 
is guaranteed by the state. Over the years, the position of 
Unédic can be summarised as ‘more employees eligible but 
for a shorter period of insurance cover’. Thus, the French 
social partners’ approach to managing the UB system is 
pro-cyclical – i.e. to decrease the system’s generosity when 
unemployment is increasing. 
Other countries which have taken a ‘pro-cyclical’ approach, 
by reducing the amount of benefits paid during the economic 
crisis, include Ireland, Lithuania and Croatia. In Lithuania, 
the maximum amount of unemployment insurance benefit 
(UIB) was reduced considerably on 1 January 2009 from 
LTL 1 042 (EUR 302) to LTL 650 (EUR 188). Amounts paid to 
old-age pensions were also reduced considerably (up to 
70 %) for employed pensioners and less so (up to 12 %) for 
pensioners not in employment. State pensions, annuities 
and other social benefits were also reduced. All of these 
reductions were introduced on a temporary basis until the 
end of 2011. The reduction of UIB had negative implications 
for the income of unemployed families and as a result, many 
were forced into a situation of applying for social assistance, 
mainly for social allowance, which directly compensates for 
reduction or loss of income (including UIB); the number of 
recipients of social allowances grew from 48 500 people 
in the middle of 2008 to 236 000 in the middle of 2011. In 
Ireland, due to the over-riding necessity of pursuing fiscal 
consolidation, the changes which have been made to the 
benefit system since the start of the economic crisis have 
taken the form of further constraints, rather than enhanced 
supports. The most significant changes which have been 
made relate to across-the-board reductions which have 
been applied to all levels of UB payments. These were a 
reduction of 4 % announced in the December 2009 National 
Budget, followed by a further cut of the same magnitude in 
the Budget of December 2010. When taken together, these 
adjustments involved a reduction of EUR 16 per week in the 
basic JB and JA payments, from EUR 204 down to EUR 188, 
with of course pro rata decreases at other benefit levels. 
Concerning structural aspects, the only changes made have 
been to reduce the duration of payment of JB (as outlined 
above) and the downward adjustment in the rates of JA paid 
to persons under 25 years. The main purpose of the latter 
change was related not so much to achieving cost reductions 
but to encouraging young people to avail of training or 
further education opportunities.
In Croatia, a number of changes were made to the UB system 
over the period of the crisis, as described in Box 3, below.
Box 3: Adjusting unemployment benefits in response to 
the crisis, Croatia
The first signs of the recession were felt in Croatia in the last 
quarter of 2008. During that year the UB system had been 
made significantly more generous, when the Act on Em-
ployment Mediation and Unemployment Rights increased 
the level of UB to 70 % of the wage earned in the previous 
three months (minus the amount of mandatory contribu-
tions but including income tax) for the first 90 days, to be 
followed by a replacement rate of 50 % and 40 % for those 
who gain access to permanent UB until their first employ-
ment or  retirement. Before this time, the UB was practically a 
flat rate benefit of around HRK 1 200 or EUR 164 per month. 
Within less than a year the economy began to feel the effects 
of the recession and unemployment had risen by 51 000. Given 
the extreme difficulties experienced in funding the national 
budget, the decrease in employment and the liquidity prob-
lems experienced by many firms in the economy, the prior-
ity measure for the Croatian economy was to cut costs. This 
prompted the new amendments to the Act on Mediation and 
Unemployment Rights in 2009, which basically defined the 
maximum amount of UB according to the minimum wage (mi-
nus mandatory contributions including income tax) during the 
first 90 days of unemployment and reduced the replacement 
rate for the unemployment period thereafter to only 80 %  
of the minimum wage, minus contributions, regardless of the 
duration of work before unemployment. For the long-term 
unemployed who had permanent benefits, the share of the 
minimum wage was reduced to 60 %. At this time no minimum 
amount of UB was envisaged, which meant that unemployed 
persons with low wages received very low benefits.
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The budgetary difficulties arising from the crisis prompted 
a second change in the Croatian Act on Mediation and Un-
employment Rights in 2010 which changed back the link of 
UB from the minimum to the average wage, as it was previ-
ously in the Act from 2008. As a result of the changes, UB 
for the first 90 days was calculated at 70 % of the average 
wage, reduced by the amount of mandatory contributions 
(as was the case in the Act dating from 2008); thereafter the 
amount of UB for all beneficiaries came to only 35 % of the 
average wage, reduced by the amount of mandatory contri-
butions. The biggest effect of this change was felt by those 
with above average wages, so it can be said that these meas-
ures helped to ensure that the most disadvantaged to date 
did not fall into greater poverty.
In Poland, although there was a change to the UB system on 
1 January 2010 – changing the payment from a continuous 
flat rate to a reduced rate by 20 % after three months of 
unemployment - this change was not intended as a response 
to the crisis and had been planned beforehand. The same 
goes for Serbia, where a major legislative change regulating 
unemployment benefits (making entitlement criteria and 
replacement rates less generous) occurred some eight 
months after the start of the crisis but in fact had been driven 
by pre-crisis experience and dynamics. Thus according to the 
national article for this country, these ‘pro-cyclical’ changes 
introduced by the new law have prevented the UB system 
from fulfilling its role as an automatic stabiliser.
In a recession, it is disadvantaged groups which find 
themselves at greater risk of losing their job and of 
encountering difficulties in finding a new one, in the context 
of greater competition for a smaller number of job vacancies. 
Furthermore, due to structural reforms of the labour markets 
in some countries in recent years, an increasing share of 
workers is employed on temporary contracts or part-time 
working schedules (13), making it easier for employers to 
lay them off at short notice and meaning that they may 
be less likely to qualify for unemployment benefits. Other 
vulnerable groups include young people and older workers, 
the self-employed and the long-term unemployed.
A number of European countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Finland, have taken steps 
to protect particular groups over the course of the recent 
economic crisis. A temporary programme is being carried out 
in Spain during 2011, linking the receipt of unemployment 
benefits to participation in activation measures. In addition, 
UB has been extended to cover also the self-employed, as 
described in the box below. 
(13) OECD, 2009, ‘The Jobs Crisis: What are the implications for employment 
and social policy?’ in OECD Employment Outlook, Tackling the Jobs Crisis. 
Internet: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/1/45219634.pdf
Box 4: Targeting vulnerable groups, Spain
In Spain, a temporary programme has been introduced in 
2011, which targets certain vulnerable groups: the young, 
the long-term unemployed over 45 and low-skilled people 
who worked in the construction sector or who are consid-
ered to be the most affected by the economic situation over 
the last three years. The Royal Decree Law 1/2011 of 11 Feb-
ruary 2011 on urgent measures to encourage the transition 
to stable employment and the professional requalification 
of unemployed people has established the right to partici-
pate in an individual path with particular training actions. 
Active participation in these actions is mandatory in order to 
receive an unemployment subsidy of EUR 400 a month, for a 
maximum of six months, which is means tested.  
In addition, in response to the crisis, access to the welfare 
unemployment subsidy has been extended. The number of 
people receiving the subsidy has increased from 448 441 
persons in 2008 to 1 074 270 in 2011. Furthermore, Law 
14/2009 created the ‘extraordinary subsidy of the temporary 
protection programme for unemployment and insertion’, 
which was especially designed for the current situation, for 
those having exhausted the UB and subsidy. This temporary 
welfare unemployment benefit is the so-called ‘EUR 420 
subsidy’ in 2009 and the ‘EUR 426 subsidy’ in 2010, with a 
maximum duration of six months. However this programme 
was not extended in 2011.
Moreover, a structural change has been made to the con-
tributory UB system, which has been extended to cover self-
employed workers who have seen their incomes reduced by 
more than 30 % in the last year. In these cases, the contribu-
tion period criteria are stricter for those who used to be self-
employed than for hired workers, ranging from two months’ 
benefits for contributions of at least twelve months up to a 
year of benefits for those self-employed who have contribu-
tions of 48 months or longer.
In Belgium, the Win-Win Plan which has been in place 
since 1  January 2010, concerns the activation of UB for 
young people (aged under 26), older workers (aged over 50) 
and long-term (from one to two years of unemployment) 
jobseekers during the years 2010 and 2011. In Luxembourg, 
particular attention has been paid to older workers, who 
have been particularly affected by the crisis and have 
benefited from an extension in the duration of payment 
of unemployment benefits as well as being targeted by 
other schemes to facilitate their return to, or retention in, 
the labour market. In Italy, several emergency measures 
were introduced immediately after the downturn became 
evident. The measures aimed mainly to increase the number 
of potential beneficiaries and to extend the scope of short-
time working arrangements and exceptional unemployment 
benefits. The following adaptations to the existing system 
were made: 
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t conceding the ordinary unemployment allowance to 
‘suspended’ (i.e. temporarily laid-off) employees in firms 
that cannot apply for the CIG schemes (see below); 
t conceding the reduced unemployment allowance to 
employees who are temporarily laid off but who only 
meet the requirements for the reduced benefit (that is, 
78 days worked during the previous year, plus the same 
insurance requirement); 
t extending, for the 2009-2011 period, the ordinary 
unemployment allowance to apprentices – either 
‘suspended’ or laid off – with at least three months of 
experience; 
t introducing, for the 2009-2011 period, a special 
lump-sum indemnity for project workers who work for 
a single employer (regime di monocommittenza) and 
whose income for the previous year falls within specific 
thresholds; 
t offering the possibility to apply for exceptional 
unemployment benefits to all types of employees 
(including fixed-term employees, temporary agency 
workers and apprentices).
In Finland, a change was also made to accommodate people 
affected by temporary lay-offs as a result of the crisis. In the 
Social Wage Agreement of January 2009, the social partners 
agreed, among other things, that the ‘Change Security’ 
activation measure should be extended to temporary 
lay-offs, so that people who are temporarily laid off would 
be eligible for training or upskilling measures. The Change 
Security measure is a package of support for long-term 
employees who have been laid off (for production-related 
reasons), which includes a bonus allowance for a return 
to learning, as well as enhanced face-to-face job seeking 
support and related services. It involves early cooperation 
between employers, employees, unions, public officials 
(particularly PES) and other stakeholders in cases where 
there is the threat of redundancies.
In Portugal, addressing long-term unemployment was a 
particular concern during 2009 and at the beginning of 
2010. In order to support the long-term unemployed, the 
government introduced a series of exceptional temporary 
measures in relation to the Unemployment Social Allowance 
(USA). In March 2009, Decree 68/2009 temporarily extended 
by six months the period during which claimants were entitled 
to receive the USA, after the expiry of their entitlement to 
UB. In June 2009, Decree 150/2009 and in March 2010, Decree 
15/2010 extended that period successively by six months. The 
temporary extension of USA duration was associated with 
a reduction of the USA amount equal to 60 % of the Social 
Support Index (IAS), corresponding to EUR 251.40 a month. 
This daily amount was accrued by a bonus of EUR 41.90 for 
each child in the household, thus giving priority to the long-
term unemployed with children.
Parents of young children were the target group of a reform 
in Slovakia, where an amendment to the Act on social 
insurance stipulated that as of 1 February 2010, the period 
during which a person is on parental leave should be included 
in the unemployment insurance record. The main objective 
was to protect parents caring for children up to three years of 
age. Previously, if not paid voluntarily, individuals on parental 
leave were not covered by unemployment insurance and 
therefore not entitled to UB if they were dismissed after 
returning to work.
Changes to the eligibility criteria and conditions associated with 
receipt of unemployment benefits were made by a number 
of countries over the course of the crisis, including the Czech 
Republic (as mentioned above), Denmark, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and FYROM. 
Some of these changes relate to the amount of contributions or 
employment history required in order to receive benefits, while 
others relate to the conditions imposed on those in receipt of 
benefits (such as job search requirements). 
Changes to the contributions and employment history 
requirements seem to be mainly reductions in the amount or 
duration required. Some of these changes were temporary 
– as in Sweden, where the membership condition for 
income-related UB was temporarily lowered from one year 
to six months during 2009, while the requirement for having 
to work in order to join a fund was abolished, creating the 
possibility for the unemployed and students to join an 
unemployment insurance fund. Others are permanent 
changes - for instance in Latvia from 1 July 2009 the period 
of qualification for UB was (permanently) decreased from 
12 to 9 months. Contribution requirements were also reduced 
in Romania (as discussed above) and in Slovakia. 
In Slovenia, the new Labour Market Regulation Act (LMRA) 
introduced in 2011 expands the range of compulsorily 
insured persons (employed and self-employed) and 
people who can voluntarily insure themselves against 
unemployment. It therefore expands entitlement to UB 
for the time of unemployment. The condition for receiving 
UB is now to have been employed for 9 months in the last 
24 months (previously it was 12 months in the last 
18 months). It thus increases the right to UB, especially for young 
people, who often have little professional experience and 
are employed on fixed-term contracts. The act also increases 
the minimum (EUR 350 gross) and maximum (three times the 
minimum level) level of UB, increases the amount of UB in the 
first three months of receipt (80 % of the average wage instead of 
70 % so far) and reduces the period for determining the average 
wage to 8 months (previously 12). Furthermore, in an attempt to 
improve the financial situation of the unemployed it offered the 
opportunity to unemployed people to work to a limited extent 
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(for up to EUR 200 per month), whilst preserving the right to 
UB and introduced the concept of partial unemployment. In 
the case of part-time employment the previously unemployed 
person retains the right to a proportion of UB. The Act also 
introduces new ALMP measures such as ‘job rotation’ and ‘job 
sharing’ and removes unnecessary administrative burdens on 
businesses and job seekers. 
In other countries it is the conditions and monitoring applied 
to those already in receipt of unemployment benefits that have 
changed. In Portugal, new measures increasing job search 
conditionality, monitoring and control were taken in 2006 and 
reinforced in 2010. In Bulgaria, the conditionality of UB payment 
on registration at the labour office was strengthened during the 
crisis. Since the beginning of 2011, an additional requirement 
exists stipulating that, in order to be entitled to UB, a person 
should register as unemployed in the Employment Agency 
within seven days after the date of suspension of insurance 
contributions. After this latest change, every Bulgarian will be 
able to exercise the right to mobility and to ‘export’ the UB to 
another EU Member State, if registered during the seven-day 
period. This change also stimulates the contact of unemployed 
persons with the labour administration and activates job search. 
In FYROM, one of the changes to the ‘Law for Employment 
and Insurance in Case of Unemployment’ made during the 
recession was to tighten the administrative requirement for 
re-registration of unemployed persons who do not receive UB. 
In Lithuania, in order to encourage unemployed recipients 
of social allowance not to delay looking for a new job and 
engaging in economic activities, from July 2010 recipients 
of social allowance have been included in the group of LLE 
customers provided with priority service (priority in being 
offered new jobs or opportunities to participate in ALMPs). 
Also, in an effort to tackle undeclared work and abuse of the 
benefits system, the local labour exchanges intensified their 
monitoring efforts, as described in the box below. 
Box 5: Strengthening the monitoring of UB recipients, 
Lithuania
As a result of reduced unemployment and social bene-
fits, some unemployed individuals in Lithuania started 
to look for additional sources of income in the shadow 
economy. Once they had found a job in the shadow 
economy, they would stay registered with their local la-
bour exchange (LLE) as unemployed and therefore re-
ceive the full social support due to them. In response to 
this, the LLE began conducting various checks, applying 
stricter requirements, and regulating visits to the labour 
exchange units and participation in ALMPs. Surveys con-
ducted by the LLE in 2009-2010 found that approximately 
30 % of persons registering with the exchanges were not 
seeking employment and registered as unemployed only 
in order to obtain the social guarantees that depended 
on the registration at the LLE.
In order to tighten controls on people registered at the LLE, 
the Procedure for Labour Market Monitoring Conditions was 
amended and updated on 22 July 2010. Control over visits to 
LLE units was tightened and registrations with the LLE were 
cancelled more often as a result of violation of registration 
rules. During the past years the LLE also began to have close 
cooperation with the State Labour Inspectorate (SLI) in or-
der to improve the identification of undeclared work.
As mentioned in Section 2, some countries also provide 
financial support to the unemployed who have only lost 
a portion of their existing working hours or who are laid 
off on a temporary basis. In response to the crisis, several 
countries have introduced part-time unemployment 
benefits to complement short-time working measures which 
are intended to enable employers to maintain their existing 
labour force but at the same time reduce their labour costs. 
Others have changed the regulations in place to enable 
people who are unemployed on a temporary basis to access 
some form of UB. 
In Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
unemployment benefits have been made available to 
employees involved in short-time working measures. 
t The German adaptation to the economic recession in 
2009 was achieved by short-time work (Kurzarbeit). In 
2008 the Federal Government began to adjust the short-
time work programme to the needs of the upcoming 
crisis. Employees losing more than 10 % of their income 
were eligible for the scheme. In terms of the level of 
income support, unemployment insurance paid social 
contributions during the first six months for short-
time workers participating in training measures and 
after six months for all short-time workers. The Federal 
Government extended the maximum period of short-
time work from the regular 6 months to 24 months and 
refunded social contributions made by employers under 
the condition that training would be provided, or that 
short-time work of more than 6 months be offered. The 
maximum duration from January 2009 to December 2009 
was 24 months and from January 2010 it was 12 months. 
Provisions were also extended to allow for cyclical and 
seasonal short-time work. Moreover, the criterion that one 
third of the staff would have to be affected by short-time 
work was cancelled. See Box 7 below for an analysis of the 
success of this measure.
t In France, in May 2009 a measure called ‘short-time 
working of long duration’ was proposed. Under this 
scheme, the insurance system, with the support of the 
state, participates in a financial arrangement offering 
employees the possibility to receive compensation for an 
amount of 75 % of their wage for a reduction of activities 
under the legal working time during a long period decided 
by their company. In return, the company must agree: 1) to 
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maintain the employment during a period that represents 
double that agreed in the convention on short-time 
working; and 2) to have an individual interview with each 
employee to examine possibilities for training actions or 
skills assessment. It is interesting to note that, in certain 
circumstances such as redundancies or compulsory 
retirement, companies have the obligation to reimburse 
the amount to the state and social partners.
t In Italy the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) schemes 
are partial unemployment benefits granted in cases of 
temporary reduction of working time or suspension of 
economic activity. They have been extended during the 
crisis (‘exceptional CIG’, or CIG in deroga) to workers and 
firms previously not eligible. This was mainly achieved 
through making exceptions to existing legislation, and by 
leaving up to the Regions the responsibility to determine 
the categories of potential beneficiaries and the duration 
of the benefits. Taking into account the degree of CIG 
utilisation, it is estimated that 362 000 full-time equivalent 
workers were covered by CIG in 2009 and 368 000 in 2010: 
had these people been unemployed, it is estimated that 
the unemployment rate in 2010 would have been 9.7 % 
instead of 8.4 %.
t In Luxembourg new benefit distribution provisions for 
short-time working arrangements have been introduced. 
In essence, the 2009 law sought to improve short-time 
working arrangements and underlying unemployment 
schemes by making two temporary adaptations. The first 
measure consists of reimbursing the employer’s share 
of the compensation allowance through the National 
Employment Fund in order to reduce the financial burden 
on companies during the crisis. In addition, the law enables 
the number of days off work each month to be adapted 
to the economic situation. At the same time, additional 
grand-ducal legislation in 2009 has raised the allowances 
(to be reimbursed by the government) for jobseekers in the 
context of short-time working schemes from the normal 
80 % (85% if the jobseeker has one or more children) of the 
unemployment allowance to 90 % of the allowance if these 
jobseekers participate in a training measure. 
t The Dutch government only took one crisis-related 
measure within the scope of the Dutch UB system, 
which was the scheme for part-time UB (deeltijd-WW), 
implemented in October 2008. Providing employees met 
all the requirements, the PES paid out UB for the number 
of hours by which the working time was reduced at a rate 
of 70 or 75 % of the normal wage. This scheme is described 
in more detail in Box 8 on Page 44.
t In July 2010 the Croatian Parliament passed a law to make 
it possible for employers to reduce the number of hours 
worked. This measure is also discussed in more detail on 
Page 45.
t In Iceland amendments made to the Unemployment 
Insurance Act in November 2008 made it possible for 
employees who had been forced to reduce their level of 
employment to complement their earnings with partial 
unemployment benefits. In addition, individuals eligible 
for earnings-related benefits could make up for their loss 
of income by spreading the earnings-related benefits 
over a longer period than the three month maximum. 
The amendments also applied to the self-employed who 
had been forced to reduce their level of operation or 
temporarily close down their business. 
In Belgium and Norway, changes have been made in order 
to provide further support to workers who have been 
temporarily laid off. The Belgian temporary unemployment 
scheme was extended to white-collar employees to limit job 
losses resulting from the recession, following consultation 
with the social partners in June 2009. Furthermore, the level 
of temporary UB was increased for all workers, from 60 % to 
75 % of previous earnings, depending on the family status. In 
Norway, there has been a series of changes concerning the 
UB available to individuals who have been temporarily laid 
off: since 1 February 2009, an employer can temporarily lay 
off employees for 52 weeks (instead of 30 previously) during 
a period of 18 months; from 1 April 2009, the obligation for 
companies to pay unemployment compensation in the case 
of temporary lay-offs was reduced from 10 to 5 days; from 
July 2009, a person who has been temporarily laid off is 
entitled to UB after a period of five days.
Other changes to income support for the unemployed 
during the economic crisis include: 
t Supporting the unemployed to continue to meet their 
mortgage payments (Poland and Portugal). For example, 
in Poland the government introduced a temporary 
measure in August 2009 offering support to unemployed 
persons to pay their mortgage instalments. The measure 
was intended to stabilise the financial situation of 
people with a credit obligation, who had lost their jobs, 
were registered as unemployed and were entitled to 
unemployment benefits. People who lost their job or 
closed their business after 1 July 2008 could apply for 
this support. Eligible persons could apply for a refund of 
a maximum of PLN 1 200 (around EUR 300) per month for 
a period of 12 months. Repayment would begin two years 
after the end of the support, in the form of interest-free, 
equal monthly payments over eight years. This measure, 
like unemployment benefits, was financed through the 
Labour Fund. 
t Additional resources to enable the PES to cope with increased 
demand (UK): One of the main changes taken in the UK in 
response to the crisis (in relation to UB) related to providing 
more resources for Jobcentre Plus (JCP) to handle the extra 
demand. In the April 2009 budget, an extra GBP 1.3 billion 
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(EUR 1.4 billion) was allocated to JCP in recognition of 
its increased workload. This was used to recruit an extra 
4 000 staff, contributing to an overall increase of around 
15 000 staff since the start of the recession. 
t Changing the system of payment of UB (Finland): The 
clearest change in unemployment benefits made in 
Finland in response to the crisis was in 2009, when the 
legislation was changed so that at least the basic level of 
unemployment allowance could be paid in advance. This 
was done to address the large backlog of payments due to 
the sudden downturn in big industries.
t Using the unemployment insurance fund to finance employer 
subsidies (Turkey): An ‘emergency package’ was adopted in 
Turkey in late 2010, which through the reduction of social 
security contributions, aimed to provide employment for 
200 000 persons in the private sector. The government 
twice prolonged the premiums, which were paid for by 
the unemployment insurance fund. 
In Latvia, in addition to a number of changes made to the UB 
system during the crisis, the ‘Work with a stipend’ programme 
was introduced to support those unemployed who had 
exhausted their entitlement to benefits. It is described in the 
box below. 
Box 6: Work with a stipend, Latvia
As unemployment surged in Latvia in 2009 it was recognised that 
measures were needed to address the growing number of indi-
viduals who had run out of UB and remained unemployed. This 
resulted in the development of the ‘Work with a stipend’ emergen-
cy public works programme, introduced in September 2009. This 
measure was set up with technical assistance from the World Bank 
and is co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF).
The measure aims to provide work and income support for the 
unemployed who no longer receive unemployment benefits 
but are willing to engage in community jobs offered by the 
municipalities. Participants currently receive a grant of LVL 80 
(around EUR 114) per month (14) based on full-time participa-
tion. The work placements must be newly created and an indi-
vidual must participate in a placement for a maximum period 
of six months and a minimum period of two weeks per year.
From September 2009 until 30 April 2011 a total of 91 116 indi-
viduals participated in the programme. An evaluation was car-
ried out by the Latvian Academy of Agricultural and Forestry 
Sciences, the results of which were published in July 2011. The 
main findings are as follows.
(14) Initially, from September 2009 until the 1 July 2011 the allowance was 
equal to 100 LVL (EUR ~ 142) and purchase and/or rent of small equipment 
was also covered. Other costs such as transport, wage supplements 
for supervisors and those organising the workplaces in municipalities 
are still covered (a fixed maximum amount for one workplace) by the 
programme.
t The average participant in the programme is over 45 years 
old with a professional or general secondary education. 
t The majority (94 %) of participants acknowledged that the 
measure provided significant or very significant income 
support during the economic crisis period. 
t For persons participating in the measure, their household 
income per person is higher than for persons waiting to 
participate in the measure or for those having recently 
participated in the measure. However, the study has 
shown that the measure was not able to completely 
eliminate the risk of poverty for the participants. The 
income level of individuals participating in the measure in 
general was lower than the poverty threshold set by the 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 
t The measure has relieved the pressure on local government 
budgets, thereby reducing the social benefits burden. 
t The measure has contributed towards increasing the 
skills of unemployed participants. According to the 
survey of participants, 50 % have increased their interest 
in searching for a job, with approximately 27 % of 
participants increasing their ability to find one. At the 
same time the survey revealed that approximately 39 % 
of activity involved individuals who were not looking for 
a permanent job on a regular basis.
As indicated elsewhere in this document, a number of 
changes were introduced in Latvia in response to the crisis. 
The majority of these changes will be phased out in the fu-
ture. In terms of the ‘Work with a stipend’ programme, the al-
lowance has been reduced to LVL 80 (EUR 114) from the sec-
ond half of 2011. The aim is to lower the financial attractive-
ness of the measure, thereby motivating the unemployed to 
seek employment and return to the labour market or take 
part in alternative employment measures. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there are a number of countries 
where the UB systems were not used as a tool to address the 
economic crisis, including Cyprus, Hungary, the UK and Turkey. 
In Cyprus, the government chose instead to deal with the 
increasing unemployment, long-term unemployment, and 
the implied hardship through a series of new programmes 
which support employability and focus on the reform of 
the PES. Hungary has also not changed its UB system and 
in the UK, the financial crisis and the ensuing recession, did 
not result in significant changes to UB, although a major 
reform of the system has been now been proposed (see 
Section 4). In Turkey, while the unemployment insurance 
fund was used to fund employer subsidies, as noted above, 
no changes to actual unemployment benefits were made. 
Instead, the government tried to devise policies to increase 
the employability of young people and provided incentives 
for the employment of women and youth. 
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3.2. Rationale for adapting unemployment 
systems and initial assessment of the 
reforms’ success
The national articles cite a range of reasons for adapting 
unemployment benefit systems during the economic crisis. 
These range from protecting UB beneficiaries and sheltering 
companies from the effects of the recession to cutting public 
budgets and increasing incentives to search for jobs. In terms 
of success, although it is early to make an assessment of most 
of the measures described above, in some countries it is 
possible to observe initial results, as discussed below. 
In Latvia, Portugal and Romania, the reasons cited for the 
reforms to the UB systems were linked to the protection 
of the unemployed from the effects of the crisis. Thus in 
Portugal and Romania the duration of UB payments was 
extended to take account of the fact that in a recession, there 
are less jobs available and people are therefore more likely 
to stay unemployed for longer. In Latvia, the main reason 
given by the government for the aforementioned changes to 
the UB system is that they would mitigate the social strain in 
society created by high and prolonged unemployment and 
reduced incomes. 
In the Czech Republic, Italy and Turkey, the UB systems are 
credited with having played an ‘automatic stabiliser’ role 
during the economic crisis. According to the national article 
for the Czech Republic, the UB system clearly played a 
stabilising role over the more recent business cycle, both as 
a fiscal stabiliser and from the worker security perspective. 
In Italy, the availability of short-time working arrangements 
from the very beginning of the crisis has proved to be a 
strength of the system and acted as an automatic stabiliser 
not only on the income side, but also on the unemployment 
side. Although no changes were made in response to the 
crisis in Turkey, existing UB arrangements did play an 
important role in their capacity as an ‘automatic stabiliser’ by 
delivering income support to households in need.
In Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Croatia, Iceland and 
Norway, measures (often measures supporting short-time 
working through the payment of short-time UB) were taken 
to protect companies from the recession and thereby prevent 
unemployment. In Norway, the changes concerning the UB 
available to individuals who have been temporarily laid-off 
were requested by social partners to make it easier, for 
companies strongly exposed to competition, to survive the 
crisis. The changes introduced aimed to provide individuals 
with an opportunity to secure a financial income, enabling 
companies to benefit from the skills an individual can bring 
to the company for this specified period and providing 
companies with more flexibility in managing lay-offs. In 
Iceland, the amendments made to the Unemployment 
Insurance Act in November 2008 aimed at cushioning the fall 
in income and making it more attractive for firms to increase 
part-time employment rather than make workers redundant. 
The amendments also applied to the self-employed who had 
been forced to reduce their level of operation or temporarily 
close down their business. 
As mentioned above, German policy during the recession 
was targeted at preserving existing jobs through short-
time working measures. The policy is considered to have 
been successful, since together with economic stimuli and 
adjustments at the company level, the German economy did 
not experience a considerable increase in unemployment in 
2009 and 2010. More detail is provided in the box below.
Box 7: Short-time working (Kurzarbeit), Germany 
Short-time work was used in various cyclical crises in Germany 
during the 1970s and 1980s and it was successfully applied 
during unification. It is designed to compensate temporary 
slumps in labour demand by a reduction of working hours in 
companies. Reduced wages are partly compensated by un-
employment insurance, while employers continue to pay for 
social security at previous income levels. Employees receive 
lower incomes due to shorter working hours but see their jobs 
preserved at least for the duration of short-time working. As 
outlined earlier in this report, in 2008 the Federal Government 
began to adjust the short-time work programme to the needs 
of the upcoming crisis. Companies had great flexibility in apply-
ing the short-time work programme and small companies had 
better chance to use this system.  
The programme worked. Together with economic stimuli and 
adjustments at the company level, the German economy did 
not experience a considerable increase in unemployment in 
2009 and 2010. While the number of short-time workers in-
creased to almost 1.5 million in the second quarter of 2009, 
the number of unemployed persons rose by not more than 0.5 
million. In the meantime, the level of unemployment declined 
to the pre-crisis level and short-time work almost disappeared. 
Working time adjustments, therefore, were a key element to 
reduce the effects of the crisis on employment and to return 
rapidly to high capacity utilisation in the upswing. 
It is one of the astonishing outcomes of the crisis that em-
ployment started to increase in Germany with the first signs 
of economic growth. Earlier recoveries were characterised by 
long time lags in employment growth due to previous labour 
hoarding (retaining more workers than is required at present 
output levels). This time it was different and such levels of la-
bour hoarding have not been observed. Economic growth was 
strong enough to absorb the productivity potentials quickly 
and the expected jobless growth did not happen.
The short-time work programme demonstrates that long-term 
planning rather than short-term action is important in labour 
market policies: having played a marginal role over almost a 
decade, it became highly important during the crisis and pro-
vided the right instruments to bridge the economic downturn. 
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In Luxembourg, the new temporary measures - mostly 
regarding short-time working arrangements - are 
also attributed to having helped so far to avoid mass 
unemployment and to keep wage earners in work. Financial 
incentives contributed to retaining skilled workers in work so 
as not to require companies to recruit a new workforce when 
the economy recovers. Furthermore, the UB system has 
worked efficiently and generously as the financial burden of 
measures has been met by sufficient financial resources put 
aside over the past boom years. 
In the Netherlands, data suggest that the use of part-time UB 
has to date successfully prevented the majority of participants 
from losing their jobs, as described in the box below. 
Box 8: Part-time unemployment benefit, the Netherlands
The Dutch government introduced a scheme for part-time 
UB (deeltijd-WW) in October 2008 as a follow-up to the 
short-time working arrangement which was used by com-
panies when the crisis first affected the Dutch economy. The 
scheme aimed to prevent unemployment and also made 
sure that companies could retain valuable personnel whom 
they would need after the crisis. 
Employers wanting to make use of the scheme had to reach 
an agreement, with employees and employee representa-
tives, to reduce working hours by between 20 % and 50 %. 
The contracts of employees in the scheme could not be ter-
minated, including through (early) retirement or expiry of 
temporary employment. Employers had to use the arrange-
ment for at least 26 weeks and after the scheme ended, 
workers involved were required to return to working their 
regular number of hours again for at least 13 weeks. In addi-
tion, the employer was required to propose training to his or 
her employees in order to improve their position on the la-
bour market. Moreover, the employees concerned were able 
to temporarily work at another employer (on secondment).
If the employees met all requirements, the PES (UWV) pro-
vided them with UB for those hours by which their working 
time was reduced. The benefit was paid at 75 % of the nor-
mal daily wage for the first two months, and 70 % thereafter. 
This meant that employees did not get wages for the hours 
they did not work – the scheme assumed that the employee 
was not entitled to his/her salary over the lost hours. 
The scheme was prolonged until the end of June 2011, al-
beit with some restrictions. New companies were able to en-
ter the scheme but companies that had already made use of 
the scheme could not re-apply. The prolonged arrangement 
was mainly intended to help to avoid problems in sectors 
with long-term orders, where companies were likely to en-
counter the effects of the crisis only in the longer-term.  
Until July 2010, about 90 % of the employees that had been in 
the part-time UB scheme and were no longer in the scheme, 
had kept their jobs. A survey of employers showed that  
14 % had retained superfluous personnel (labour hoarding).  
The main reasons for doing so were to prevent the loss of 
valuable personnel (67 %), high dismissal costs (31 %) and a 
perceived shortage of labour in the near future (21 %). About 
4 % of these employers used the part-time unemployment 
benefit scheme to finance labour hoarding.
The number of participants in the scheme has quickly 
dropped as a result of the economic recovery. By December 
2010 about 8 500 people were participating and in February 
2011 there were 6 000. The inflow into the scheme also fell 
significantly. In total 75 000 people made use of part-time un-
employment, of which 62 000 have already left the scheme. 
In contrast to the Dutch experience, the short-time working 
measure applied in Croatia has had a very different outcome; 
the take-up of the measure was very low. It is suggested that 
the measure was introduced too late in the recession - by the 
time the measure was introduced, the recession had already 
deepened and the outflows from employment were already 
underway, since other conditions such as ability to pay had 
been reduced to a level which had repercussions across the 
economy. Thus it was too late for measures initially meant 
to retain workers while cutting production. Furthermore 
the method of implementation is also said to have been 
inappropriate; there was a lot of administrative red tape and 
the level of subsidy was very small, somewhat in excess of 
HRK 1 000, i.e. EUR 137 per person. 
Timing was also felt to have been an issue in Slovakia, where 
discussions concerning revisions to the unemployment 
support scheme began at the beginning of 2009, following 
the significant increase in unemployment. However, hesitant 
political positions together with a rapidly declining fiscal 
situation resulted in a restricted revision of the UB scheme 
that was only approved in February 2010. The timing of 
the policy measures (effective from 1 September 2010) was 
considered too late to support groups most affected by the 
crisis, so that the changes had little ‘anti-cyclical’ effect. 
In other countries (e.g. Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Iceland) where the reforms decreased the generosity of the 
UB systems, the priority was to cut the costs of the systems 
to the public budgets or maintain the financial sustainability 
of the systems. In Estonia for instance, recent changes have 
mostly concentrated on maintaining the sustainability of 
the unemployment system during the crisis (by increasing 
employers’ and employees’ contributions) rather than 
increasing expenditure (through wider eligibility or 
increased generosity of the system). In Latvia, some of 
the changes described above were intended to reduce the 
budgetary burden of the UB system, for example through 
introducing the benefit ceiling. In Iceland, as mentioned 
previously, it was suggested that the amendments to the 
Unemployment Insurance Act would generate more funds 
for ALMPs and counselling. 
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The cuts in Ireland have proved to be highly controversial. 
The decreases in basic JB and JA payments were not mitigated 
by any counterbalancing adjustments elsewhere and in 
fact were only part of a wider range of benefit cuts which 
applied to all welfare support, except for State pensions 
and invalidity supports. Furthermore, other household 
supports, such as child benefit, have also been substantially 
reduced in recent Budgets. Some groups, the trade unions 
in particular, have been highly critical of the approach taken, 
arguing that the scale of the welfare reductions, when taken 
with the numerous other budget adjustments, is such that it 
will impact negatively on aggregate demand and suppress 
economic growth – thus making it more difficult address 
the deficit in the State finances. The more widely held view 
is that the problems in the national finances have to be 
addressed first, since if the deficit position is allowed to drift, 
the economic problems will intensify, and correction will be 
much more difficult.
The Lithuanian government placed the key focus during 
the economic downturn on the stabilisation of the national 
budget, with less of a focus on employment and labour 
market policy measures. The main instrument for stabilising 
the national budget was saving, i.e. wage cuts in the public 
sector and the reduction of other budget expenses. As a 
result, the maximum amount of UIB was reduced considerably 
from 1 January 2009. However, the Government’s approach 
in respect to UIB payment and labour market policy is not 
considered to have been effective and has not reached the 
intended results – the reduction in the amount of UIB led 
unemployed people to apply for social allowance and other 
social guarantees. As a result, what was saved by reducing 
UIB had to be spent on social allowances and the provision of 
other social guarantees. Furthermore, the wider participation 
of the unemployed in the social assistance scheme drew 
them into a poverty trap and increased participation in the 
shadow economy. Declining living standards and the overall 
limitation of social guarantees (particularly reduction of 
old-age pensions and unemployment benefits) reduced 
the confidence of Lithuanian residents in the national social 
welfare system and contributed to the spread of emigration 
and the shadow economy.
In Serbia, as noted previously, the ‘pro-cyclical’ changes 
introduced by the new 2009 law are said to have prevented 
the UB system from acting as an automatic stabiliser. However, 
the total spending on unemployment benefits increased both 
in 2009 and 2010 because of the removal of benefit arrears. 
Therefore, despite the less generous replacement ratios, 
the unemployed who were eligible for the benefits were at 
least protected much more efficiently, as the data on overall 
expenditures show, by receiving their benefits when they 
needed them the most. In fact, although the legislative change 
regulating unemployment benefits occurred some eight 
months after the start of the crisis in Serbia, the draft of the new 
law on employment and unemployment insurance was largely 
prepared before the start of the crisis. Therefore, the new 
solutions were driven by pre-crisis experience and dynamics. 
The philosophy behind the new (2009) law was simple; it was 
meant to strike a better balance between active and passive 
labour market policies and to promote the activation of the 
unemployed, including the recipients of unemployment 
benefits. Until 2009, spending on passive measures comprised 
some 90 % of total spending on labour market polices, despite 
the fact that the benefit coverage rate hardly ever exceeded 10 % 
of the total registered unemployed persons. Put simply, 10 % 
of the registered unemployed were receiving some 90 % of the 
total available resources for labour market policy aimed at the 
unemployed. 
Incentivising the unemployed to find work (more quickly) or 
to pursue training opportunities was the rationale behind 
the policy changes in other countries, including the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland and Lithuania. In the Czech 
Republic, it is suggested that the introduction in January 
2009 of a higher replacement ratio during the first two 
months of unemployment, and thus the steeper decline 
in replacement ratios during unemployment spells, would 
provide the unemployed with a stronger incentive to leave 
the unemployment register as they see their benefit levels 
decline. In Denmark, although the reform of the UB system 
will lead to an increase in the number of persons losing the 
right to unemployment benefits, it has been argued that 
it will help increase in the labour supply in the longer run, 
which will lead to a corresponding increase in employment. 
In Lithuania, the inclusion of recipients of social allowance 
in the group of LLE customers provided with priority service 
was made in order to encourage these benefit claimants not 
to delay looking for a new job and engaging in economic 
activities. Under the priority service, unreasonable refusal 
of a job offer or failure to appear at the LLE is a basis for 
the cancellation of registration with the LLE and, as a 
consequence, loss of the right to receive social allowance. 
As noted above, the changes made to the rates of JA paid 
to persons under 25 years in Ireland were mainly intended 
to encourage young people to avail of training or further 
education opportunities.
In Bulgaria, Estonia (see page 18) and Slovenia, the reforms 
introduced are intended to be a step further in the 
implementation of the concept of flexicurity. In Bulgaria, 
a daily UB was introduced in 2010, calculated as 60 % of 
the average daily remuneration, instead of the previously 
applied monthly benefit. This change was made in order 
to stimulate employment flexibility and sustainability. As a 
response to the economic crisis the Slovenian government 
adopted (relatively late) in October 2010 and introduced in 
January 2011 the new Labour Market Regulation Act (LMRA), 
as mentioned above. The main objectives of the new act are 
to introduce the concept of flexicurity in the labour market 
by increasing the security of persons who have lost their 
jobs, by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of active 
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employment policy measures, by reducing administrative 
burdens for businesses and people in the labour market and 
by strengthening the control of institutions in the labour 
market. The aim is also to extend labour market measures 
(e.g. career guidance, preparation for employment, etc.) to 
cover both the unemployed and those who are in the process 
of losing their employment. 
3.3. Duration of the measures
In the context of the European Employment Strategy, 
developments in the field have been monitored by the 2010 
Joint Employment Report (JER) prepared by the Council and the 
European Commission (15). The JER noted that throughout the 
crisis, European social protection systems have suffered a strong 
stress test with the sharp increase in unemployment. However, 
they have played an instrumental role as ‘automatic stabilisers’, 
by cushioning the immediate social impact of the downturn 
and mitigating the risk of the unemployed falling into poverty. 
The JER indicated that if some passive measures introduced in 
past recessions (such as early retirement, exit towards disability 
and sickness benefit schemes) are counterproductive, income 
support measures have provided relief to many in need 
since the onset of the crisis. This explained the fact that in a 
number of Member States, the duration, level or coverage of 
unemployment benefits were adjusted.
However, it is important that anti-cyclical measures are 
temporary, in order to maintain the sustainability of public 
finances. Furthermore, while it is important to provide both 
re-employment assistance and income support to people 
who lose their jobs as a result of the economic crisis, at the 
same time the provision of income support needs to be 
designed to avoid the risk of high social benefit dependency 
after the recession has ended (16). Thus an important issue to 
be considered, in relation to the use of ‘automatic stabilisers’, 
is how these will be phased out. For instance, the 2011 JER of 
the Council and the European Commission (17) recommended 
that temporary extensions of benefits and of the duration of 
unemployment insurance introduced in the context of the 
economic crisis should be reviewed as the economic recovery 
becomes more stable and when more jobs become available.
In a number of countries, the measures described above were 
introduced on a temporary basis and in some countries have 
already been phased out. In Bulgaria for example, entitlement 
to long-term UB came into force during 2007 to 2010. However 
in 2010, the share of long-term unemployed persons (of the total 
number of unemployed) increased to 46.4 % due to the crisis, 
creating an additional burden on the Unemployment Fund. 
Thus in 2011 the entitlement to long-term UB was revoked.
(15) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05037.en10.pdf
(16) OECD, 2009, ‘The Jobs Crisis: What are the implications for employment 
and social policy?’ in OECD Employment Outlook, Tackling the Jobs Crisis. 
Internet: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/1/45219634.pdf
(17) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st07/st07396.en11.pdf
In Portugal, the UB reforms during the crisis can be divided 
into two very different phases. There was a first phase of 
measures taken in 2009 and at the beginning of 2010 which 
included increasing the duration and the amount of certain 
benefits and granting access to groups previously not 
covered by the UB. The second phase started in the second 
half of 2010, reversing not only this increased protection level 
but also some of the protection level that existed prior to 
the crisis. In fact, most of the temporary anti-crisis measures 
in Portugal were withdrawn before their expiry, leading to 
decreased protection levels due to the austerity measures 
introduced in June 2010.
In other countries, austerity measures have meant that the 
measures introduced during the crisis will be prolonged 
or deepened, or that new changes have been made or 
are planned for the UB systems. In Ireland, the process of 
cutting UB payments is likely to continue; as fiscal correction 
is scheduled to continue for at least three more years, there 
have been clear signals that these rates are likely to be 
reduced again. 
In the Czech Republic, in January 2011 a special low 
replacement rate of 45 % (of UB relative to previous net 
monthly wage) was introduced for those unemployed who 
left their last job voluntarily or without ‘serious reasons’ 
(loosely defined by the law). This tightening of the UB 
system was mainly motivated by the austerity programme 
of the newly elected government. Since 2011, UB is also not 
provided during the months when the unemployed worker 
collects severance pay (the UB eligibility period is postponed 
rather than reduced). A problem with this clause is that 
eligibility for severance pay automatically leads to delaying 
UB disbursement even if severance pay is not actually 
paid by the employer. This tightening of the UB system in 
2011 was introduced within the across-the-board austerity 
drive as the increase in 2009 replacement rates was not 
seen as a temporary anti-crisis measure (18). Other changes 
include for example the cancellation of the opportunity 
for earned income (from low-paid or part-time work) to 
be supplemented with benefits; this option was abolished 
in January 2011 (within the ‘austerity’ package) as it was 
suspected that it facilitated significant UB misuse. 
In pursuit of its tough austerity programme, the current 
Romanian Government reduced by a further 15 % the 
amount of UB as well as of all other associated benefits in 
mid-2010, in what was a radical internal devaluation aimed 
at re-balancing the country’s budget. While preserving for 
the whole of 2009 and even in 2010 the principle which 
allowed for the calculation of the basic component of the 
UB in relation to the minimum salary (75 % of the latter), 
the Romanian Government moved finally to sever this link in 
January 2011 and make the UB dependent on the reference 
(18) The lower social security contribution rates for low-wage workers were 
already phased out by the end of 2010 
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(benchmark) social indicator, set at the value of RON 500 
(EUR 119) (minimum salary at RON 670 / EUR 159). 
The Romanian Government also tightened, at the end 
of 2010, the eligibility conditions for UB in an attempt to 
prevent abusive use by enterprises and individuals alike, of 
repeated spells of UB within a period of less than 12 calendar 
months. As such the minimum eligibility condition of 12 full 
months of contribution during the 24 months preceding the 
application for benefit has been further tightened, calling 
now for a minimum of 12 months in between two successive 
applications and thus removing the possibility to repeat 
claims in the span of 24 months through the cumulative use 
of contribution periods used by the same beneficiary for an 
earlier benefit claim. This condition however, while justified 
in terms of financial sustainability and prevention of abusive 
practices, creates a certain disadvantage for workers in 
temporary or seasonal jobs as well as for young people.
In other countries, changes have only recently been 
implemented or are proposed for the coming year. For 
instance, in Belgium, in March 2011 the ceilings used to 
determine the UB rate were increased by 1.25 % and the 
benefit rate for single workers in the second period of 
unemployment was also raised from 53 % to 55 %. From 
1 September 2011, the minimum and flat-rate levels will be 
raised by 2 %. In Bulgaria, the government took a decision 
to abolish the upper threshold of UB in 2011 while preserving 
its protected minimum amount. This entails an increase in 
compensation for job loss, allowing the unemployed to 
preserve their previous living standard. 
4. Reform priorities within the Europe 
2020 framework 
In January 2011, the European Commission released its first 
‘Annual Growth Survey’ (AGS) (19) which sets out 10 priorities 
for tackling the EU’s main economic challenges. The AGS is 
the first step in a new system to help national governments 
to coordinate their responses. The AGS brings together 
the different actions which are essential to strengthen the 
recovery in the short-term, to enable Europe to keep pace 
with its main competitors and to prepare the EU to move 
towards its Europe 2020 objectives.
The 2011 AGS stresses that reforms to UB systems need to 
focus on strengthening employment incentives. Hence, 
under the sixth priority action ‘Getting the unemployed back 
to work’ the AGS calls for reforms oriented towards: 
t designing activating UB systems which reward 
unemployed people returning to work or entering self-
employment;
(19) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/tools/monitoring/annual_growth_
survey_2011/index_en.htm
t tax and benefit systems ensuring that work pays; and 
t unemployment insurance systems that adequately adapt 
to economic conditions. 
The Joint Employment Report (JER) (20) which accompanies 
the AGS also stresses the need for UB systems to provide the 
right incentives to work, while ensuring income support and 
adaptability to the business cycle. The JER also highlights 
that further reforms to UB systems and other benefit schemes 
should aim to combine efficiency gains and fairness. It 
suggests that unemployment and other employment-related 
benefits systems should continue to ensure an adequate 
level of protection at any phase of the economic cycle and be 
sufficiently flexible to enable benefits to be easily adjusted to 
fluctuations of the cycle. 
These recommendations are also in line with the Guidelines 
for the employment policies of the Member States (21), which 
should orientate national reforms in this area during the 
current cycle of the European Employment Strategy and the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. In particular, Guideline 7 on ‘Increasing 
labour market participation of women and men, reducing 
structural unemployment and promoting job quality’ draws 
attention to the need to set up adequate social security 
systems to secure labour market transitions, accompanied 
by clear rights and responsibilities for the unemployed to 
actively seek work; while Guideline 10 on ‘Promoting social 
inclusion and combating poverty’ also states that benefit 
systems should focus on ensuring income security during 
transitions and reducing poverty, in particular among groups 
most at risk of social exclusion. 
This section reviews recent measures and those proposed/
planned in the 33 EEO countries which are of relevance to the 
structural reform priorities set out in the AGS and JER. Given 
that the adaptation of unemployment benefits is discussed 
in the previous section, the focus here is on measures to 
strengthen activation policies and ALMPs and those to 
improve the coverage of benefits. Some additional proposed 
reforms are also described. 
4.1. Measures to strengthen activation policies 
and ALMPs
In addition to income support measures, it is important that 
the unemployed are supported through activation measures 
and ALMPs during a recession, in order to facilitate their 
return to work and thereby ensure that the benefits ‘safety 
net’ functions ‘as a trampoline and not as a passive net’ (22). 
(20) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/3_en_annexe_part1.pdf
(21) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:308:0
046:0051:EN:PDF
(22) OECD, 2009, ‘The Jobs Crisis: What are the implications for employment 
and social policy?’ in OECD Employment Outlook, Tackling the Jobs Crisis. 
Internet: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/1/45219634.pdf
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A number of countries have put forward plans or proposals 
to strengthen ALMPs and activation measures, including 
Belgium, Greece, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Portugal, Slovakia, FYROM and Norway. For instance, the 
Latvian National Reform Programme (NRP) for the period 
2011-2013 focuses on strengthening and developing 
ALMPs in order to increase the efficiency and quality of the 
unemployment training process, among other objectives. 
As the economic situation improves, emphasis has turned 
to providing job search assistance and matching activities. 
A public works programme will be introduced from 2012, 
resuming a previously implemented measure for those 
in long-term unemployment. The Portuguese Initiative 
for Competitiveness and Employment (Iniciativa para a 
Competitividade e o Emprego), launched in December 
2010, includes the goal of implementing active employment 
policies throughout 2011, to enhance the employability of 
the unemployed and young people seeking employment. 
The initiative also foresees plans to (further) strengthen 
activation policies in relation to qualification and vocational 
training. 
In Belgium, the economic crisis and increasing 
unemployment led to a debate on the effectiveness of 
the activation procedure. A new unemployment support 
scheme has been adopted; however, negotiations have 
yet to be held with the regions in order to finalise a new 
cooperation agreement. The activation procedure should 
now be more rapid and more individualised as soon as 
unemployed individuals register with a regional PES. The 
elaboration of the personal action plan by the regional PES 
and the first interview with the federal employment service 
will take place sooner. Monitoring will be suspended if the 
jobseeker engages in at least 20 hours of training per week 
or if he/she is declared ‘at a distance from the labour market’. 
Exclusion from UB will occur only after a six-month period 
during which UB will be reduced by 25 %. 
In Hungary, as part of the newly proposed ‘Hungarian Work 
Plan’ UB recipients will be obliged to take part in public works 
programmes. Although this programme has the potential to 
activate a large number of non-working individuals, it also 
has risks, as explained in the box below. 
Box 9: Public Works Programme, Hungary 
Reaching and activating the non-working population is a ma-
jor challenge for employment policy in Hungary. The recent-
ly introduced ‘Hungarian Work Plan’ (HWP) includes a public 
works programme, which means that unemployed people 
who want to receive cash benefit must accept any public 
work offered to them, regardless of their level of education. At 
the same time, the unemployment insurance receipt period 
has been dramatically shortened and UB has been abolished. 
This means that what remains is a restructured social assis-
tance system which is now essentially based on public works. 
Remuneration for public works has a lower limit at a special 
minimum wage, which is below the minimum wage applica-
ble to the open labour market. One reason for this is the inten-
tion of motivating participants to enter the open labour mar-
ket; another is that public employment is expected to come 
with a set of fringe benefits such as support for commuting 
and temporary accommodation if the work is undertaken in 
a remote area. Public works can be organised by the state, by 
municipalities and by churches and cover a wide range of jobs 
from building to community service. An interesting feature is 
that it will be possible to outsource participants to private 
companies operating in certain areas (such as forestry) under 
similar conditions (contractual arrangements and wages) to 
those in the actual public works. This ALMP is thus used as 
both a way of delivering some cash to the poor but is also an 
attempt to activate the longer-term unemployed, providing 
wage flexibility in an unorthodox way.
If delivered efficiently, the HWP has the potential to activate 
around 200 000 non-working individuals who will be shown 
as employed in the employment statistics. They will be able 
to obtain cash benefit only through work, thereby motivat-
ing them to work. Similarly, a lower than market wage will 
certainly provide some genuine motivation to enter the 
open labour market. However, it is yet to be seen how this 
motivation will relate to other factors which may strongly af-
fect outcomes, such as the ability of the affected individuals 
to work (which is currently often very poor). All we know at 
the moment is that in the past, under more prosperous eco-
nomic climates, public works participants have benefited 
less than those in other programmes or those participating 
in no programmes at all. Studies have shown that partici-
pants in public works have lower employment chances than 
other unemployed people, which can be caused by several 
factors, including the lack of time for job search. This shows 
that it will be very difficult to make this ALMP work well.
Thus, although there are a number of similarities in the aims 
and actions proposed by the HWP to the structural reform 
priorities set out in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and 
Joint Employment Report (JER) (e.g. the need for fiscal con-
solidation, labour market reforms for higher employment, 
making work attractive, and getting the unemployed back 
to work) there are also a number of questions regarding the 
policy programme. These relate for instance to the fact that 
the direct cost of public works is yet to be seen, the risks of 
crowding out both private investments and workers on the 
open labour market, and the fact that the short unemploy-
ment insurance period makes it easier to dismiss workers 
and re-hire them as public workers, among others. There is 
also a risk of a poverty trap and segmentation that can seri-
ously endanger social inclusion efforts. 
In Norway, activation policies to improve job search efforts by 
people receiving benefits are high on the policy agenda. For 
the last 10 to 15 years, policy changes have been aligned with 
the international trend connected with ‘workfare’ policies, 
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activation policies to avoid long-term or permanent inactivity 
and reforms to make working life more ‘inclusive’. One 
particular issue to be tackled in Norway is the structural high 
unemployment rates among immigrants and one measure 
proposed to increase their employment rate is to make 
participation in different forms of training courses compulsory. 
The Dutch government will actually introduce budget 
cuts for reintegration tools starting in 2012. The effects are 
likely to have an impact on people furthest from the labour 
market and people who work while receiving some kind of 
support, for instance people whose employer receives wage 
costs subsidies. In particular costly programmes are likely 
to disappear, such as wage subsidies to compensate for the 
lower productivity of people with disabilities which have an 
impact on their work. As a consequence, an increase of 45 000 
people claiming social assistance (WWB) is expected, partly 
due to the proposed integration of the three benefit schemes 
for people at a greater distance from the labour market. This 
contradicts the aim of increasing labour participation and 
could moreover result in an increase in the number of people 
or families in poverty.
In Ireland, activation measures have recently been extended 
and reformed. To a large degree this initiative derives from 
an OECD review of activation policies in Ireland published in 
2009 (23). This report found that that the Irish welfare system 
applied a somewhat benign approach to what the study 
called ‘benefit gatekeeping’, particularly in regard to the 
application of conditionality provisions and monitoring job 
search. The study also considered that Irish benefit rates were 
somewhat high, particularly when viewed in the context of 
the relatively low levels of activation measures in place. The 
activation initiative will encompass a reform of the National 
Employment Action Plan (NEAP), which is to be refocused 
in order to establish clearer pathways to employment by 
ensuring that State services interact early with those who 
have lost their jobs to provide opportunities for facilitating 
job search, work experience placements or education and 
training as appropriate. However, it is of interest to note 
that a recent study (24) recommended that, given the current 
economic context, ‘it would be particularly appropriate at 
present to focus more heavily on the provision of short-term 
training programmes for jobseekers. The objective would 
be to enhance their skills in areas where jobs are likely to 
emerge in the future’. This would seem to be a relevant point 
to raise, given that employment opportunities are likely to 
remain scarce in Ireland for several years. 
The latter point may also be relevant for other countries 
suffering from continuing high unemployment as a result 
(23) OECD (2009). Activation Policies in Ireland. Social. Employment and Migra-
tion Working Papers, No. 75. Paris. 
(24) McGuiness, O’Connell, Kelly, Walsh (2011). Activation in Ireland: An Evalu-
ation of the National Employment Action Plan. ESRI Research Series 20. 
Dublin
of the crisis. In a similar vein, the OECD suggests that the 
evaluation criteria of labour market programmes should 
shift somewhat in the context of a jobs crisis ‘from achieving 
immediate gains in employment and earnings to preserving 
the integrity of the mutual-obligations approach to activation 
and keeping the growing number of long-term unemployed 
connected to the labour market’. Thus the introduction of 
labour demand supports such as public sector job creation 
– targeted appropriately - should be considered as a support 
to activation regimes at such a time (25).
4.2. Improving beneﬁts coverage and ‘making 
work pay’
Reforms to improve the coverage of benefits and introduce 
the principle of ‘making work pay’ have been recently 
introduced or are proposed in several countries. 
In terms of coverage, in Sweden for instance, the government 
has opened a debate concerning the introduction of a 
mandatory social insurance and intends to reform the UB 
system in two ways: to make income-related benefits cover 
all persons in employment; and to make the conditions for 
economic protection during unemployment and the basis 
for deciding the level of compensation equal for all workers. 
A Government committee is due to present its proposal 
on this reform in March 2012. In Slovakia, a reform to 
streamline ALMPs is being prepared and a new intermediate 
labour market programme is expected to encourage the 
unemployed, in particular long-term unemployed recipients 
of welfare benefits, to take up low-paid employment while 
providing them with temporary financial assistance and 
other forms of support to facilitate (re-)entry to the labour 
market. In Turkey, it is suggested that the reform priority 
should be to increase eligibility coverage, since for example 
part-time workers and the self-employed are not currently 
covered by unemployment insurance. 
The self-employed are the target group of measures in Austria 
and Finland. In Austria since 2009 self-employed persons 
have been given the opportunity to voluntarily opt into the 
unemployment insurance system and improve their social 
protection, while in Finland, the self-employed and other 
entrepreneurs will be one of the targets of the government’s 
efforts to streamline and simplify unemployment and 
social benefits. Although unemployment benefits for this 
group have been improved by several successive Finnish 
governments, they still lag behind the benefits received by 
wage earners. 
In Austria and France the duration of benefit payments has 
recently been extended, in combination with measures to 
support the unemployed to return to work. In Austria, from 
(25) OECD, 2009, ‘The Jobs Crisis: What are the implications for employment 
and social policy?’ in OECD Employment Outlook, Tackling the Jobs Crisis. 
Internet: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/1/45219634.pdf
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2011 onwards the UB period was extended to 78 weeks for 
beneficiaries participating in a vocational rehabilitation 
measure. This change was not a direct response to the 
crisis but was intended to guarantee a better level of social 
protection in cases when immediate re-integration into 
the labour market could not be achieved. In France the 
professional securing contract (contrat de securisation 
profesionnelle, CSP) will allow employees who have been 
laid off to keep nearly the same wage as they earned 
previously over a year while they find a new job. Now opened 
to precarious working contracts, the measure will be mostly 
financed by Unédic (two thirds) and partly by the state (one 
third). In return, jobseekers will have reinforced support by 
Pôle Emploi, to return more quickly to employment. 
In Norway, changes in rules relating to UB were introduced 
in 2011 in relation to parental benefit, maternity benefit and 
sickness benefit in connection with pregnancy, so these can 
now be counted as earned income for the minimum income 
requirement to be eligible for UB.
In relation to the concept of ‘making work pay’, reforms 
taken in Turkey and Croatia can be mentioned. In Turkey, 
one of the urgent measures taken in response to the 
economic crisis was to provide health insurance coverage for 
student apprentices in the workplace, which is considered 
a good move for making work pay. In Croatia, the national 
Programme of Economic Recovery aims to reduce the cost of 
labour by avoiding all additional taxes such as contributions 
for water management and the chamber of commerce 
and to reduce the number of income tax brackets and the 
progressiveness of the tax. Reducing the total labour cost 
will make work pay more, but it is questionable whether this 
will be low enough to compete with the rate in the informal 
sector since the take-home pay for informal work is higher 
than in the formal sector, making this type of work more 
financially attractive. In Malta, it is also suggested that the 
government needs to continue developing innovative ways 
to make work pay, with a focus on the low-skilled, especially 
the recipients of special unemployment benefits, married 
people and those with large households, who have fewer 
economic incentives to find work.
In the UK, the government’s proposal for welfare reform, 
described in Box 10 below, aims to make the system fairer, 
to focus on making work pay and to combat abuse of the 
benefit system. The reforms are consistent with the first two 
areas of reform highlighted in the 2011 Annual Growth Survey 
(designing activating UB systems which reward unemployed 
people returning to work or entering self-employment, and 
tax and benefit systems ensuring that work pays). 
Box 10: The ‘Universal Credit’, United Kingdom
In the UK, the government has proposed to replace the 
existing system of benefits (including unemployment ben-
efits) with a ‘Universal Credit’, as part of its proposed Welfare 
Reform Bill. The main elements of the bill are as follows:
t the Universal Credit will provide a single streamlined 
benefit that will ensure work always pays;
t there will be a stronger approach to reducing fraud and 
error with tougher penalties for the most serious offences;
t a new claimant commitment will be introduced showing 
clearly what is expected of claimants while giving 
protection to those with the greatest needs;
t the Disability Living Allowance will be reformed through 
the introduction of the Personal Independence Payment;
t a fairer approach to Housing Benefit will be created to bring 
stability to the market and improve incentives to work;
t abuse of the Social Fund system will be driven out by 
giving greater power to local authorities;
t the Employment and Support Allowance (a benefit for 
people who are unable to work due to illness or disability) 
will be reformed to make the benefit fairer and to ensure 
that help goes to those with the greatest need;
t there will be changes to support a new system of child 
support which puts the interests of the child first.
Welfare reform is embodied in the introduction of the Universal 
Credit. The receipt of benefits will be linked to tough tests on 
‘conditionality’ through the ‘Work Capability Assessment’ which 
will assess what a claimant is capable of, given their own indi-
vidual circumstances such as disability, care commitments, etc.  
The new system will be introduced from October 2013. Any 
overall cost savings for the welfare budget are not clear. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) reports that because the new 
system is likely to be easier to access for claimants, this may 
increase the take-up of benefits and thus increase the over-
all size of the welfare budget. More positively, they also re-
port that the new system is likely to create work incentives 
for the majority of benefit recipients, except for second in-
come earners in couples, since their benefits will be reduced 
sooner under the new system. 
These changes constitute a radical reform of the welfare 
system in the UK. However, some commentators feel that 
the package of reforms is insufficient. The Institute for Eco-
nomic Affairs (IEA), for example, while in general support-
ing the direction of the reforms, suggests that they fail to 
go far enough. With regard to UB, the report proposes that 
continuing work requirements should be placed on those 
claimants not in full-time work but receiving benefits, the 
administration of which would be done at a local level with 
appropriate delegated responsibility. 
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4.3. Additional reforms
Reforms of the existing systems of UB, or the PES, are in train 
or are recommended in a number of countries, including 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, 
Slovakia, Sweden, the UK (see Box 10 above) and Croatia. 
For instance the national article for Romania suggests that 
a new unemployment insurance law is more than due. The 
current act, although modified and updated, remains tied 
to the past, paying tribute to a market reality that is itself 
foregone. In Italy, the country’s largest trade union (the 
CGIL) has put forward a proposal for the UB system to be 
streamlined from the current seven instruments down to 
two: a universal UB and a short-time working arrangement 
covering temporary suspensions of workers and replacing 
the different typologies of CIG which are currently in place.
In Bulgaria, the focus is on ensuring the quality of the PES 
which is considered to be key to future reforms. The 2011 
Employment Promotion Plan foresees the introduction of 
PES quality standards and their certification. 
In Sweden, a reform of the system of funding UB is currently 
under debate and there has also been a proposal by the 
Fiscal Policy Council to make benefit levels dependent on the 
current level of unemployment, as described in Box 11 below. 
Box 11: Proposal for a systematic adjustment of unem-
ployment benefits, Sweden
The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council has suggested that benefit 
levels could be dependent on the current level of unemploy-
ment in relation to average unemployment during the two 
previous years. For example, the benefit level could increase 
above its normal level if unemployment is 1.5 % above the 
previous two-year average level of unemployment (and de-
crease below normal level when unemployment reaches 1.5 % 
below the previous two-year average level). Under this rule, 
benefit levels would increase during periods when unem-
ployment is increasing and benefit levels would decrease 
when unemployment is falling. 
Undeclared work is an issue which needs to be tackled in 
several countries, including the Czech Republic, Croatia and 
Turkey. In Croatia, it is suggested that before the flexicurity 
principles can be applied in order to achieve both income 
security and a more flexible labour market, integrated 
policies need to be put in place to discourage work in the 
informal economy while also aiming to legalise as many of 
the economic activities as possible and bring them within 
fiscal reach. In Turkey, the broader challenge relating to 
unemployment benefits is said to be in formalising workers 
who work in the informal economy. It is also recommended 
that existing rigid employment protection regulations 
should be relaxed and  hiring and firing practices should 
become more flexible. 
Increasing flexibility on the labour market is being pursued 
in Romania, where the Government has made dramatic 
revisions to the UB system in line with the priorities set in the 
Europe 2020 framework. In the meantime, the Government 
revised both the Labour Code and the legal framework 
on social dialogue in spring 2011. As such, more flexibility 
has been induced on the market, negotiations have been 
decentralised, a new role has been given to social dialogue 
bodies and the link between the public and private sector 
with respect to both salaries and the negotiation of collective 
labour agreements severed. 
The Slovenian government has also recently produced 
a number of strategic and legal documents with the aim 
of creating a relatively comprehensive response to the 
challenges of the Slovenian economy and labour market and 
to introduce the concept of flexicurity more decisively into 
Slovenian society, as a frame for a new social security. 
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5. Conclusions
As a result of the economic crisis, unemployment has 
increased across Europe, leaving many people in need 
of financial support to avoid falling into poverty as well 
as help to find a new job. In response to the high levels of 
unemployment brought about by the recession, aggregate 
data show that European countries have increased 
expenditure on LMPs, including both ALMPs and passive 
measures providing income support, such as unemployment 
benefits. 
UB systems vary considerably across Europe in terms of their 
structure, generosity, entitlement and eligibility criteria. 
Across Europe, Governments have made a range of changes 
to national UB systems during the crisis, including both 
increasing and decreasing the generosity of the benefits, 
adjusting the eligibility criteria, widening access to include 
certain vulnerable groups, tightening the monitoring of UB 
claimants and utilising unemployment benefits to support 
short-time working measures. The reasons given for making 
these changes range from protecting UB beneficiaries and 
sheltering companies from the effects of the recession to 
cutting public budgets and increasing incentives to search 
for jobs. In terms of success, although it is early to make an 
assessment of most of the measures described above, in 
some countries the use of UB to support short-time working 
measures appears to have had some positive impact on the 
workers and companies concerned. 
Many of these measures were temporary and, in some cases, 
new adjustments have been made as part of ‘austerity 
measures’ which are now being implemented in order to 
improve public finances. Looking to the future, a number of 
countries are taking steps towards implementing two of the 
recommendations in the AGS in relation to UB systems – to 
reward unemployed people returning to the labour market 
and to ensure that ‘work pays’. Plans for a range of activation 
measures and ALMPs are mentioned in several countries 
and further adjustments to the UB systems are also ongoing 
in some countries. In relation to the AGS recommendation 
that unemployment insurance systems should adequately 
adapt to economic conditions, the only notable example 
can be found in Sweden, where it has been proposed that 
benefit levels could be dependent on the current level of 
unemployment. However as this Review has shown, many 
countries are already utilising their UB systems to respond to 
changes in the economic climate.
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